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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE LAW’S 
RESPONSE TO AGENCY COSTS IN NIGERIA 
Dr. Ige Omotayo Bolodeoku*
I. INTRODUCTION 
orporate failures are hardly a new story.1 Indeed, states and econo-
mies have failed in the past, and many more are failing. However, 
the magnitude of corporate failures and the extensiveness of their impact 
have made them part of the several issues hotly debated in contemporary 
corporate and political governance scholarship.2 This also helps to ex-
plain why in the United States, a country with a federalized corporate 
law system, the federal government, following major corporate failures 
in 2001, introduced certain corporate governance safeguards that were 
once overlooked or considered unnecessary.3 What is interesting is that 
C 
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 1. They led to the first corporate governance project chaired by Adrian Cadbury in 
1992. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(Burgess Sci. Press 1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/ 
documents/cadbury.pdf [hereinafter CADBURY REPORT]. In Nigeria, the Failed Banks 
(Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act, (2004) Cap. F2, Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, is the institutional response to the failure of financial 
institutions in the early 1990s. In 2003, Nigeria’s Corporate Affairs Commission and 
Securities and Exchange Commission launched the Code of Best Practices on Corporate 
Governance for publicly quoted corporations in Nigeria. In 2006, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria released a Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria after the consoli-
dation of Nigerian banks, to become effective from April 3, 2006. 
 2. See Jean Cartier-Bresson, The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: Eco-
nomic Analyses and Lessons Learnt, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., NO 
LONGER BUSINESS AS USUAL: FIGHTING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 11, 12 (2000) (dis-
cussing agency problems in the political governance context, the author said: “Opportuni-
ties for corruption depend on the size of the rents in the control of public agents, the dis-
cretion they have in allocating them, and their lack of a sense of accountability to soci-
ety.”). 
 3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). Sar-
banes-Oxley is essentially a response to the systemic problems in corporate governance, 
underscored by the collapse of Enron and other big corporations in the United States. 
Other institutional responses to corporate failures have come by way of reform of corpo-
rate governance rules. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
LISTINGS STANDARDS COMM., REPORT (2002) [hereinafter NYSE REPORT]. For Nigeria’s 
approach, see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
IN NIGERIA (2003). 
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failures, be they of corporations or states, are traceable, in part, to a 
common source, that is, activities of the respective agents representing 
the institutions.4
Every representative system must confront the problem of agency 
costs, whether as an internal matter or one that informs policy considera-
tions by the appropriate regulatory bodies of governance structures.5 To 
be sure, agency costs are inevitable in a representative system, be it a 
business corporation,6 government, or any other form of association, 
whose activities are, in the nature of things, conducted by human be-
ings.7 In other words, agency problems are associated with the delega-
tion of power, management, and control, and thus highlight the transac-
tion costs of specialization, which undoubtedly create value and enhance 
efficiency.8 On a more positive note, however, agency costs may be con-
ceptualized as the transaction costs which a representative system must 
incur in ensuring efficiency in the system. In this regard, the system’s 
success may be measured both in terms of the magnitude of the costs 
 
 4. To be sure, the agency relationship is pivotal to the existence and operations of 
business corporations. See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the 
Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 274 (1998) (“Legal agency relationships are one 
foundation of business organizations. Without legal agency, business firms of any com-
plexity are impossible.”). Note also that both law and reality supports the use of agency 
for the company’s activities because of the company’s peculiar nature as a legal entity. 
For example, sections 63 and 64 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) au-
thorize a company to act through both institutional agents, such as the board of directors 
and the members in general meetings, and any agent or officer appointed by those two 
organs. Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, §§ 63, 64 (Nige-
ria). Even at the board level, the law permits a board of directors to delegate all its pow-
ers to an individual, called the managing director. See id. § 64(b). 
 5. For a discussion of agency concepts and costs, see Stephen A. Ross, The Eco-
nomic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973). 
 6. It is important to note Orts’ caution regarding the nexus between agency costs and 
the firm. See Orts, supra note 4, at 278 (“Although agency costs help to explain the eco-
nomic dynamics of firms, they are not sufficient to explain the existence of firms and 
their boundaries.”). 
 7. Orts argued that, “agency costs provide one important theoretical explanation for 
limitations on the size of firms.” See Orts, supra note 4, at 275. In fact, the primacy of 
agency relationships to societal development may be better understood from the perspec-
tive of division of labor. For works describing the value of agency to development, see 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 
(Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH 
OF NATIONS]; EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, 11–30 (1997); Mi-
chael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, and Organiza-
tional Structure, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS 251 (Lars Werin & Hans Wijkander eds., 
1992) [hereinafter Jensen & Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge]. 
 8. See discussion supra note 7.  
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incurred relative to the benefits produced and by how well the costs are 
controlled or managed. On the whole, however, the inevitability of 
agency costs reinforces the need to design effective strategies for their 
management.9
In a corporate law context, the complexity of agency problems and 
costs is shaped, among other things, by both organizational size and 
ownership structure.10 A big organization with a large membership size 
(or diffused membership) will likely face graver agency problems requir-
ing special contrivances for control than one that is small and has man-
ageable and concentrated membership.11 While agency costs usually 
emanate directly from the conduct of those entrusted with the manage-
ment responsibility of a given system, their persistence may depend on, 
and sometimes be exacerbated by, certain exogenous factors such as cul-
ture,12 perception, and the existence or lack of alternative control or in-
tervention systems. Effective agency costs management will thus require 
that control systems are designed around the internal setting of the sys-
tem; however the possibility that internal structures may weaken inter-
nal-oriented control mechanisms should serve as a reminder of the need 
to have alternative intervention systems.13
This Article will examine whether the response of the 1990 Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA or Act) and other allied legislation to 
 
 9. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) [here-
inafter Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm].  
 10. See James S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole & James Wuh Lin, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 55 J. FIN. 81, 87 (2000) (finding that agency costs (1) are higher when an 
outsider rather than an insider manages the firm, and (2) are inversely related to the man-
ager’s ownership share). 
 11. One needs only to remember the analysis of Berle and Means about shareholders’ 
size and its impact on management behavior and agency costs. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. 
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933). 
 12. See Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1262 (2002) (“The key point is not that one society or another is 
better off, but that culture would affect how the three-player contractarian corporate 
model played out.”). Roe contrasted the reaction of the Swedish to the retirement com-
pensation of Percy Barnevik. See David Woodruff & Almar Latour, Barnevik Gets Harsh 
Verdict in Court of Public Opinion: Former ABB Chief Is Disgraced in Pension Plan, 
WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 18, 2002, at A1. For a broader analysis of cultural impact on cor-
porate law evolution, see Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a 
Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 
(2001). 
 13. In the context of this Article, the provisions of CAMA on investigation by the 
Corporate Affairs Commission are treated as the alternative control mechanism that can 
substitute for the failures of the internal control mechanisms. See Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, §§ 314–15. 
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agency problems are effective enough to guarantee good and accountable 
corporate governance in Nigeria. To be sure, this Article recognizes that 
other institutions beyond the law matter in measuring the effectiveness of 
the law itself. However, examination of these other institutions is not 
within the scope of this Article.14 The Article gives a pass mark to the 
CAMA, while noting areas that may need to be re-examined for reform. 
Analysis in this Article begins in Part II with an explanation of the con-
cept of agency costs, pointing out how agency costs may present differ-
ent challenges in relation to public companies in two separate situa-
tions—public companies with disperse ownership structure and those 
that combine both dispersed and concentrated ownership. The latter type 
is of particular importance to Nigeria, as most companies in Nigeria are 
in this category. Part II further defines agency costs and examines their 
relationship with the concept of separation of ownership and control. Part 
III focuses on the theoretical and normative analysis of how agency costs 
may be effectively dealt with in both types of public companies already 
noted in this Article. Part IV examines the CAMA provisions in order to 
assess the Act’s response to agency problems. This Part examines some 
of the provisions of CAMA in light of the normative or theoretical analy-
sis guidelines discussed in Part III. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF AGENCY COSTS EXPLAINED 
A. Foreground 
The organization of resources for productive purposes through the cor-
porate form has become virtually complete, in the sense that it is domi-
nant. A country will usually have a mix of private and public companies, 
with the former used mainly where organization of business through the 
partnership form would have been ideal; while the latter used not only 
where the requirement of capital is extensive, but also where it is in-
 
 14. Note, for instance, that the judicial system is always pivotal not only to enforce-
ment of rights in general, but also in ensuring the reduction of agency costs, in terms of 
prompt response to litigations in the enforcement of fiduciary duties. One may also note 
that the search for global capital, which forces domestic companies to either seek credit 
facilities abroad or list their securities in foreign stock exchanges, may require more dis-
closures on their part, thus enhancing the production of information and monitoring. See 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance 
(1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=183908 [hereinafter La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection] (“When investor rights such as voting rights of the shareholders and the reor-
ganization and liquidation rights of creditors are extensive and well enforced by regula-
tors or courts, investors are willing to finance firms.”). 
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tended to pool resources from a wide range of individuals sharing no 
other relationship than the mere coincidental desire to earn income from 
the resources they lack the capability or time to invest.15 Investment is 
not costless. It requires not only the capability and time to invest, but 
also the acumen to make resource allocation decisions which many peo-
ple do not have.16
While the membership of a typical public company is large and dif-
fused, and the individual stake of its members (investors) is small rela-
tive to the company’s overall capitalization, it is not uncommon to have 
public companies, characterized by both concentrated and widespread 
share ownership. In their seminal book, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
alerted the public to the consequences of the emerging modern corpora-
tion in which ownership of shares, due to its diffusion, is separated from 
control. “The corporate system appears,” they observed, “only when this 
type of private or ‘close’ corporation has given way to an essentially dif-
ferent form, the quasi-public corporation: a corporation in which a large 
measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through 
the multiplication of owners.”17 Indeed, this separation can only be found 
in the United States and United Kingdom. In many other Anglo-
American jurisdictions, share ownership of companies is largely concen-
trated. Often, in such companies, owners are also managers. 
We, however, need not look further than Nigeria to get the sense of the 
other type of public company that combines concentration and diffusion 
of share ownership. Virtually all public companies in the financial and 
non-financial sectors have shareholders holding significant proportions 
of the issued shares,18 with some even holding a clear majority.19 Yet, 
 
 15. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. 
REV. 259 (1967) [hereinafter, Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems]. 
 16. See Jensen & Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, supra note 7, at 253. 
 17. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11, at 4 (theorizing that the quasi-public corporations 
were dominating corporate America).  
 18. For a discussion of the ownership structure, see Boniface Ahuwan, Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 269, 271–73 (2002). One should note that 
Ahunwan’s description of bank structures as widespread may mask the reality, because 
most banks, at least before the 2005 reform, had both combined concentrated and wide-
spread ownership. Recent developments in the banking sector, which this Article ad-
dresses, have the potential to produce more diffuse share ownership of banks.  
 19. Recently, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) implemented a policy that requires 
all banks to increase their paid up share capital to twenty-five billion naira by December 
2005 at the latest. For further description of this policy, see CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, 
GUIDELINES AND INCENTIVES ON CONSOLIDATION IN THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY 
(Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://www.cenbank.org/out/publications/bsd/2004/ 
consolidationold.pdf. This policy will definitely occasion widespread share ownership of 
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there is, to some extent, widespread public ownership of the remaining 
equity. Two separate and unrelated developments in the Nigerian corpo-
rate landscape are increasingly helping to shape the ownership structure 
of registered companies.20 First, the privatization of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) in Nigeria, which favors the sale of SOEs to strategic or 
core investors,21 is bound to turn out a good number of public companies 
with concentrated share ownership, and also ensure widespread partici-
pation by the public in equity of the affected enterprises.22 While the 
government is to retain 40% of equity and cede 40% to strategic/core 
investors in the partially privatized industries,23 the underlying policy is 
to cede the management of privatized enterprises to the strategic/core 
investors.24 On the one hand, this arrangement produces investors who 
are not only substantial shareholders, but also retain managerial powers. 
On the other hand, the arrangement brings about widespread share-
ownership in the public. 
The second development is the decision by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) to raise the shareholders’ funds of Banks to twenty-five billion 
naira. By forcing existing banks to either merge or approach the capital 
market in order to raise the requisite funds, the policy will invariably 
change the ownership structure of existing banks in Nigeria. It is worth 
noting that out of the eighty-nine banks that existed before the CBN in-
troduced this new policy, only twenty-nine banks survived the exercise. 
 
banks in Nigeria, which may begin a path to the separation of ownership and control in 
line with the Berle and Means construct.  
 20. For analysis of some of the factors that historically shaped the ownership structure 
of Nigerian companies, see Ahunwan, supra note 18, at 270–71.  
 21. Defined as “formidable and experienced [corporations or consortia] with the ca-
pabilities for adding value to an enterprise and making it operate profitably in the face of 
international competition.” See Guidelines on Privatization of Government Enterprises, 
in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON PRIVATISATION, THE PRIVATISATION HANDBOOK 49, para. 13.2 
(2001), available at http://www.bpeng.org/docs/Privatization%20Handbook.doc. In fact, 
management skill is one of the qualities that core or strategic investors must possess. 
 22. The privatization guidelines require strategic/core investors to acquire up to 40% 
of the equity capital of affected enterprises. See Public Enterprises (Privatization and 
Commercialization) Act (PEA) 1999, First Schedule, pt. 1, in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON 
PRIVATISATION, THE PRIVATISATION HANDBOOK 25 (2001). For more on the selection of 
strategic/core investors, see Guidelines on Privatization, supra note 21, at paras. 14.1–
14.4.  
  Additionally, paragraph 12.3 of the Guidelines on Privatization provides that “no 
individual shall be allowed to acquire more than 1% equity in any enterprise whose 
shares are offered for sale” under the privatization program. The guidelines reinforce the 
philosophy of widespread ownership of the Public Enterprises (Privatization and Com-
mercialization) Act (PEA) 1999. See PEA, paras. 5(2), 5(3).  
 23. See id., First Schedule, pt. 1. 
 24. See id., para. 4. 
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Additionally, the CBN indicated that domestic banks would be allowed 
to manage part of Nigeria’s external reserves if only they could meet a 
threshold of equity capital. This statement induced some banks to ap-
proach the capital market for more equity funds.  
These developments create two possibilities. First, the share ownership 
structure of banks that emerged from mergers is likely to be both concen-
trated and dispersed. Second, banks that had to depend on the capital 
market to raise the required equity capital and those still canvassing that 
market for more funds in order to qualify are likely to have more dis-
persed ownership. The degree of concentration of share ownership of 
banks in this category will depend on how much equity they need to raise 
from the capital market, the spread of share ownership, and how often 
the company returns to the market for further funds. 
It is worth noting that the corporate landscape in Nigeria is dominated 
by companies in which corporate managers are also significant share-
holders. Here, residual claimants are also the decision agents, while mi-
nority shareholders, that is, individuals with small equity interests, have 
no decision-making power or authority, nor could they exert any tangible 
influence on decision makers. This minority group is often invisible in 
corporate governance due mainly to rational apathy.25 As scholars Cub-
bin and Leech noted, “if the controlling group is management operating 
through ownership, then increasing dispersion will have the effect of 
making management’s position more secure and the firm’s behavior 
more ‘managerial.’”26
B. Agency Cost Defined 
In an agency relationship,27 three basic propositions are crucial to a 
proper understanding of the concept of agency costs. First, there is a gen-
eral assumption that an agent, like all human beings, is a utility maxi-
mizer.28 Second, it is not economically expedient for an agent to capture 
 
 25. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 55 (2d ed. 1971). 
 26. John Cubbin & Dennis Leech, The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the De-
gree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement, 93 ECON. J. 351, 354 
(1983). As the authors noted, management has more discretion to pursue its own objec-
tives at the expense of shareholders than in cases where there is no controlling sharehold-
ers. Id. 
 27. This is defined “as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agents.” See Jensen & Meckling, The-
ory of the Firm, supra note 9, at 308. 
 28. For another view criticizing the classical assumptions about agents from a behav-
ioral perspectives, see Daniel Levinthal, A Survey of Agency Models of Organisations, 9 
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the total value added to his or her principal’s business. Were an agent 
able to do so, it would be hard to imagine how the principals could make 
gains by engaging an agent. Third, agency from an economic perspective 
not only explicates specializations of tasks, but also helps to increase 
efficiency. These propositions accentuate the functionality of the agency 
concept just as they underscore the need to properly meter the agent’s 
performance and ensure that appropriate reward systems are provided to 
motivate the agent to good performance. 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling defined agency costs as the sum 
of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expendi-
tures by the agent, and the residual loss.29 They further argued that, even 
if both the principal and agent incur monitoring and bonding costs (non-
pecuniary as well as pecuniary), there would still be some divergence 
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maxi-
mize the welfare of the principal.30  It is the dollar equivalent of such 
reduction in welfare experienced by the principal that Jensen and Meck-
ling referred to as the “residual loss.”31 Jensen and Clifford Smith char-
acterized this definition “as the sum of the out-of-pocket costs of struc-
turing, administering, and enforcing contracts (both formal and informal) 
plus the residual loss.”32 As they explained, enforcement costs “include 
both monitoring and bonding costs, that is, resources expended by the 
principal and agent, respectively to ensure contract enforcement,” 
whereas, residual loss “represents the opportunity loss remaining when 
contracts are optimally but imperfectly enforced.”33 Agency costs “in-
clude all the costs frequently referred to as contracting costs, transactions 
costs, moral-hazard costs, and information costs.”34
Despite its wide acceptance in the literature, the Jensen and Meckling 
definition requires some qualification. Bonding expenditures on the part 
of an agent do not exacerbate agency costs; rather, they attenuate them. 
Whether agents will incur bonding expenditures depends on the agents’ 
appreciation of their importance (in terms of their unique or peculiar 
 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 153, 154 (1988) (“As with neoclassical theory more generally, 
agency theory can be criticized from a behavioral perspective for its narrow view of ra-
tionality and its assumptions regarding economic agents’ cognitive abilities.”). 
 29. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra note 9, at 308. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Michael C. Jensen & Clifford W. Smith, Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor 
Interests Applications of Agency Theory, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
93 (Edward I. Altman & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, eds. 1985) (citing Jensen & Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm, supra note 9). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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skills or expertise and their marketability) to the principals’ businesses, 
the competitiveness of their positions, and the viability of a principal’s 
agent replacement options. More importantly, however, the pecuniary 
value of bonding expenditures increases the principal’s gain rather than 
derogates from it. Indubitably, bonding expenditures are costs to the 
agents; but, they are costs from which both the principal and the agent 
are expected to benefit. 
Additionally, the above definitions are somewhat inadequate for omit-
ting the cost effects of the various incentive programs that a principal 
may implement with a view to aligning the agent’s interest with his own. 
While incentives may take several forms, they usually have monetary 
value. Strictly, the cost component of an incentive (or reward) system 
seems to fit uneasily into the monitoring taxonomy, although both moni-
toring and incentive systems are directed toward the same goal: reducing 
profusion and shirking by the target agent. However, if inappropriately 
designed, an incentive or a reward system may further exacerbate agency 
costs. Enron, WorldCom, and Nortel provide useful explications of this 
point.35
C. The Dynamics Between Agency Costs and the Separation of Owner-
ship and Control 
To the extent that the reduction of agency costs depends, in part, on the 
ability of a principal to monitor the agent’s activities, the separation of 
ownership and control will remain a factor in the overall design of con-
trol mechanisms needed to reduce agency costs. But as noted above, a 
modern analysis of the agency problem must take into account the vari-
ous shades or degrees of separation of ownership and control, since dif-
 
 35. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of 
the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 
1242 (2002) [hereinafter Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management] (discussing 
stock-based director compensation as a double-edged sword: it “may enhance the board’s 
vigor as a shareholder agent but also increase its ambivalence about uncovering embar-
rassing facts that will reduce the share price”); see also PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS IN ENRON’S COLLAPSE, S. REP. NO. 107-70 (2d. Sess. 2002) [hereinafter 
ENRON REPORT] (detailing how top executives at Enron Corporation abused stock op-
tions). Recent revelations on the “financial reporting mess” at Nortel Inc. show that the 
company’s executives, with the acquiescence of the board of directors, adopted financial 
reporting methods that allowed them to report artificial profits on the basis of which they 
paid out bonuses that were contingent on the profits. At least twelve executives returned a 
total of Can$10.4 million representing the value of the bonuses they collected under the 
fraudulent scheme. See Tyler Hamilton, Review Rips Former CEO, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 
12, 2005, at C1. 
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ferent types of separation create peculiar delegation problems requiring 
special measures and attention. 
The nexus between agency costs and the separation of ownership and 
control has received recognition for quite some time, beginning with 
Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith highlighted the 
problem of agency costs by linking it with the separation of ownership 
and control. He stated that: 
The directors of such companies . . . being the managers of other peo-
ple’s money that of their own, it cannot well be expected that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small mat-
ters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a 
dispensation form having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company . . . .36
Berle and Means captured the inevitability of agency problem in their 
book, given what they saw as the emerging pattern of ownership struc-
ture of public companies in the United States. According to them:  
The surrender of control over their wealth by investors has effectively 
broken the old property relationship and has raised the problem of de-
fining these relationships anew. The direction of industry by persons 
other than those who have ventured their wealth has raised the question 
of the motive fore back of such direction and the effective distribution 
of the returns from business enterprise.37  
It is in the foregoing context that Jensen and Meckling’s observation be-
comes apposite.  
Since the relationship between the stockholders and the mangers of a 
corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should 
come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the 
“separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership 
corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of 
agency.38
One only needs to add, for the purposes of this Article, that it is the de-
gree of separation of ownership and control that will determine the 
acuteness of the associable agency problems and the measures that 
should be taken to solve the problems.   
 
 36. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at bk. 5, ch. 1, art. I. 
 37. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11, at 2. 
 38. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra note 9, at 309. 
2007] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 477 
                                                                                                                                 
III. CONTROL OF AGENCY COSTS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 
A. Nature of the Problem 
A typical public company has a complex authority structure. The board 
is entrusted with the power of management or with the power to super-
vise management.39 As is often the case, there is a delegation of man-
agement authority to the chief executive officer (or management direc-
tor) with further delegation to other top, but lower-level managers, de-
pending on the organization’s size. In this regard, the shareholders, often 
far removed from operational details of a typical public company, are 
poorly positioned to police top management or the board of directors, 
because they lack material information that is key to monitoring.40 How-
ever, we have another genre of public companies in which share owner-
ship is both concentrated and diffused. Most publicly listed companies in 
Nigeria fall into this category. The two sections following will discuss 
the agency-costs implications of the two types of public companies and 
how they may, at least, in theory, be addressed. 
B. Analysis in the Context of Public Companies with Dispersed Owner-
ship 
Where no single shareholder holds significant proportion of the com-
pany’s shares to be able to influence decisions or remove directors from 
office, it is unlikely that the shareholder group will be able to monitor the 
company’s management effectively. Monitoring is not costless, as it re-
quires a great deal of information as well as the ability to analyze, proc-
ess, and utilize the information as a monitoring tool.41 Above all, the cost 
of monitoring is a key factor that is likely to shape shareholders’ moni-
toring behaviors. The shareholders often face collective action42 and free 
 
 39. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, §63(3) (Nige-
ria); Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 44 § 102(1) (1985) (“[T]he directors 
shall manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of a corpora-
tion.”); see also THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(May 2002), available at www.brtable.org/pdf/704.pdf. 
 40. See Orts, supra note 4, at 316. 
 41. On the value of information to monitoring, see Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. 
Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Proximity, Objectivity, and 
Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356 (2004). 
 42. This term has been widely written about in political and social sciences and exam-
ined from different perspectives. See OLSON, supra note 25, at 53–54. According to Mi-
chael Taylor, “a collective action problem exists where rational individual action can lead 
to a strictly Pareto-inferior outcome, that is, an outcome which is strictly less preferred by 
every individual than at least one other outcome.” MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF 
COOPERATION 19 (1987). 
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rider problems where they are dispersed and each has a small proportion 
of the company’s shares.43 Because all the shareholders of a company 
will share in the benefit of monitoring, while the monitoring shareholder 
bears the financial burden of monitoring alone, the assumption is that 
shareholders of a widely held company will remain rationally apathetic 
to monitoring.44
On the other hand, management is more organized as a unit to respond 
to allegations of misconduct or improprieties, knowing that shareholders 
are unlikely to have the necessary information to substantiate claims. 
Information becomes more expensive and difficult to gather where dis-
closure of material changes are not mandated; the only option being for 
the shareholders or creditors to privately bargain for the right to informa-
tion on key transactions. Management controls the flow of information, 
and has access to the corporate treasury to prosecute proxy contests. 
Thus the limitation of the shareholders’ monitoring capability, measured 
against the real possibility that corporate managers of widely held com-
panies may shirk or become involved in unfair dealings and positional 
conflicts, raises the need to devise control mechanisms that will reduce 
agency costs.45 Discussed below are some of the control devices com-
mentators have identified for addressing agency costs in the context un-
der consideration. The discussion will serve as a prelude to the assess-
ment of the CAMA and other allied legislation in Nigeria. 
1. Separation of Decision Management and Decision Control 
Open corporations or publicly held companies are usually character-
ized by two distinct features, both of which help explain the nature of 
 
 43. For a recent analysis of the rational apathy theory, see Ige O. Bolodeoku, Corpo-
rate Governance in the New Information and Communication Age: An Interrogation of 
the Rational Apathy Theory, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 69, 72–76 (2007) [hereinafter Bolo-
deoku, Rational Apathy Theory] (discussing how the possibilities created by the Internet 
in information gathering, analysis and dissemination may motivate shareholders, espe-
cially retail shareholders, to be more active in corporate governance).  
 44. See Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 776, 779–83 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corpo-
rate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 402 (1983). 
 45. Note that other studies identify a tradeoff between dispersed ownership and 
managerial performance. See Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large 
Shareholder, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q.J. ECON. 693, 694 (1997) (The 
authors argue that, “to the extent that managerial initiative . . . contributes to firm value, 
there is a trade-off between the gains from monitoring and those from managerial initia-
tive.” Dispersed ownership, they argue, induces managerial initiative, as it implies little 
interference with managerial discretion, while concentrated ownership reduces those 
initiatives and firm value, because it facilitates excessive limitation of managerial discre-
tion or initiatives.). 
2007] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 479 
                                                                                                                                 
agency costs and how they should be controlled. First, shares (or the re-
sidual claims) of a publicly held company are unrestricted and freely 
tradable, a fact that allows residual risks46 to be spread across many re-
sidual claimants and enables risk bearers to diversify across companies 
offering such claims.47 This feature ensures that none of the residual 
claimants bears enough risk to create a real need for participation in 
company management. Since the capital requirement of a typical public 
company is large, it is cost efficient to have a wide range of individuals 
bear the residual risk. Second, the size of such an organization and its 
activities are such that specific knowledge relevant for decisions is 
widely diffused among agents, so that efficiencies in decision making are 
accomplished by delegating the decision-management rights to agents 
with the specific knowledge valuable to those decisions.48
The need for specialized risk bearing and management inherently pre-
sents agency problems that need to be controlled. As Eugene Fama and 
Michael Jensen observe, “control of agency problems in the decision 
process is important when the decision managers who initiate and im-
plement important decisions are not the major residual claimants and 
therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their deci-
sions.”49 They propose that effective control procedures are necessary, 
because such decision managers are more likely to take actions that devi-
ate from the interests of residual claimants. In this regard, and coupled 
with the necessity to delegate decision rights, Fama and Jensen suggested 
that an effective system of control requires that “decision management”50 
be separated from “decision control.”51 Without the separation, they ar-
 
 46. Defined as “the risk of the difference between stochastic inflows of resources and 
promised payments to agents.” Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Agency Problems and 
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 328 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Agency 
Problems].  
 47. See Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis 
of Limited Liability in Corporate Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 142 (1980); Manne, Our 
Two Corporation Systems, supra note 15, at 262. 
 48. Jensen & Meckling, Special and General Knowledge, supra note 7, at 257. 
 49. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Ownership and Control]. 
 50. Defined as the initiation and implementation of decisions. Id. at 308. 
 51. Id. at 308. This includes the ratification and monitoring of decisions. As Fama and 
Jensen noted, the devices for separating management and control include: (1) hierarchal 
structures in which decision initiatives of lower-level agents are passed on to agents 
above then in the hierarchy, first for ratification and then for monitoring; (2) boards of 
directors that ratify and monitor the organization’s most important decisions and hire, 
fire, and compensate top-level decision managers; and (3) incentive structures which 
encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents. Management and decision control 
are the components of the organization’s decision process or decision system. Id. 
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gued that residual claimants have little protections against opportunistic 
actions of decision agents, just as non-separation lowers the value of un-
restricted residual claims (shares). However, “diffusion and separation of 
decision management and control have benefits because they allow 
knowledge to be used at the points in the decision process where it is 
most relevant and they help control the agency problems of diffuse re-
sidual claims.”52 While separating decision management and decision 
control will not eliminate agency costs, the value of such separation53 
lies in the fact that “the benefits of diffuse residual claims and the bene-
fits of separation of decision functions form residual risk bearing are 
generally greater than the agency costs they generate.”54
One clear implication of the foregoing view is that the control of man-
agement, and thus of agency costs, will be undertaken by a board of di-
rectors which must, at least, be independent of the managers, and whose 
main duty will be to monitor and ratify managerial decisions, in order to 
curb managerial shirking and opportunistic behaviors.55 It will appear 
that this approach does not actually anticipate that the board will run the 
company’s business and affairs; rather it anticipates that the board will 
undertake the task of supervising the managers. However, the optimism 
of effective monitoring by the board of directors is, oftentimes, illusory, 
since the social and economic relationship between top-level managers 
and members of the board can, in fact, undermine the latter’s effective-
ness as monitors.56 In a recent work, Boot and Macey affirm, on a new 
 
 52. Id. at 309.  
 53. Part of the value of separating decision management and decision control is the 
general administration of executive compensation by independent, outside members of 
the board of directors, whose role, essentially, is to monitor the performance of inside 
board members and determine their compensation. Such a scheme creates incentives for 
managers to monitor other managers, particularly when there is the possibility that hard-
working managers may be promoted over the lazy ones. See Jensen & Smith, supra note 
32 (“Lower level managers have an incentive to monitor managers above them because 
of the interdependence of their productivities, as well as the direct gains from success-
fully stepping over less competent managers.”). 
 54. Fama & Jensen, Ownership and Control, supra note 49, at 309.  
 55. Contemporary corporate governance codes or projects emphasize the need to have 
a corporate board that can effectively monitor management. To do this, the codes have 
not only suggested that a majority of the board members should be independent of man-
agement, but that the position of a managing director and that of the head of the board of 
directors should be occupied by two persons. See CADBURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 57; 
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE COMBINED CODE: PRINICIPLES OF GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND CODE OF BEST PRACTICE (May 2000); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
IN NIGERIA, supra note 3.  
 56. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 658–59 (1982) [hereinafter Brudney, Independent Director]. 
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theoretical basis, the doubts expressed by some commentators that the 
management and directors relationship is a factor likely to undermine the 
objectivity of proximate monitors such as the directors.57
The orthodoxy is that a board of directors comprising mostly of inde-
pendent/outside directors will be more daring to challenge management 
in appropriate circumstances, and yet promote a friendly working atmos-
phere among the executives and non-executive members of the board.58 
Indeed, it has been suggested that independent directorship is a better 
mechanism than regulation for the monitoring of management’s integ-
rity, efficiency, and social responsibility. While independent directorship 
has become a global phenomenon, Enron, WorldCom, and other major 
corporate failures continue to raise doubts in the minds of many and, in 
particular, its critics, on whether the board alone, even with a majority of 
independent/outside directors, can be relied upon to effectively monitor 
corporate managers.59 In particular, despite the clamor for the independ-
ence of directors and the effort by many companies to promote it, corpo-
rate failures under the watch of independent directors are worse in inten-
sity than when the consensus for independence began about thirty years 
ago.60
 
 57. See Boot & Macey, supra note 41, at 369 (“In addition to psychological barriers 
to objectivity, proximate boards lack objectivity from an economic perspective. Board 
supervision generally means that the board is jointly responsible with management for the 
state of the firm.”). 
 58. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 39, at 11–13. 
 59. See Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management, supra note 35, at 1241–45 
(discussing the fact that, notwithstanding the appearance of independence, a corporate 
board could still be compromised as was the case with the Enron board); see also Brud-
ney, Independent Director, supra note 56, at 612–14. On how to address the failures in 
the internal monitoring process, see Michael C. Jensen & Joseph Fuller, What’s a Direc-
tor to Do? (Harvard NOM Research Paper No. 02-38, Oct. 2002), available at 
www.http://ssrn.com/ABSTRACT=35772 [hereinafter Jensen & Fuller, Director to Do?] 
(criticizing these practices as responsible for the ineffectiveness of corporate boards as 
monitors and recommending what the board must do to fulfill their role as the top-level 
corporate control mechanism); John Pound, The Promise of the Governed Corporation, 
in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 79 (2000). 
 60. For a view reinforcing this position, see Alton B. Harris & Andrea S. Kramer, 
Corporate Governance: Pre-Enron, Post Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE 
PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR 
CORPORATIONS 49, 76–78 (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003). 
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2. The Use of a Combination of Mandatory and Suppletory 
 Constitutive Rules 
The law matters.61 Undoubtedly, there is a sort of correlation between 
investor protection and control of agency costs. As scholars have argued:  
When investor protection is very good, the most the insiders can do is 
overpay themselves, put relatives in management, and undertake some 
wasteful projects. After a point, it may be better just to pay dividends. 
As the diversion technology becomes less efficient, the insiders expro-
priate less, and their private benefits of control diminish.62
Melvin Eisenberg identified certain characteristics of publicly held 
companies,63 which should help determine the proper approach to deal-
ing with agency costs that arise in company management. First, it is 
Eisenberg’s view that bargaining in a publicly held company among the 
shareholders, or between managers and the shareholders as a body, is 
virtually impossible.64 Accordingly, he observed that most of the consti-
tutive rules of such a company are determined not by contract,65 but by 
law or private bureaucratic rulemaking, i.e., by managerial orders; by 
board or committee resolutions; by board-adopted by-laws (articles of 
association); or by the board’s determination of governance terms in pre-
ferred stocks, stock rights, or debt instruments.66
 
 61. La Porta et al., Investor Protection, supra note 14. 
 62. Id.  
 63. First, Eisenberg defined the companies to mean those that “have a large number 
of shareholders, most of whom neither participate in the management of the company nor 
directly monitor corporate management.” Second, he observed that in a publicly held 
company, the number of managerial and non-managerial agents is also large, and for 
reasons of efficiency the business of the company is controlled and conducted by those 
agents. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1461, 1471 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Corporation Law]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Eisenberg was in fact responding to the view expressed by the contractarians, 
such as Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract] 
(“The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law 
enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of 
risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy. No one set of terms will be 
best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ structure of corporate law . . . .”). 
 66. Id. It should be noted that Eisenberg’s analysis relates to the corporate law system 
in the United States. Obviously, some of the powers given by statute to a board of direc-
tors are expressly dealt with by the legislature under CAMA. A board of directors of a 
Nigerian company lacks the competence to alter the articles of association (by-laws) 
without recourse to the general meeting or to vary the voting rights of the shares it issues, 
as these matters are regulated under CAMA in a manner that leaves no discretion to the 
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While recognizing that the interests of the shareholders and managers 
of a public company converge in many respects, Eisenberg noted that, as 
in any principal-agent relationship, the two interests also diverge. Basi-
cally he argued that managers of a public company are prone to shirking, 
outright diversion of the company’s assets to personal use through unfair 
self-dealing, and, more importantly, to positional conflicts.67 To him, 
while top managers of public companies might control shirking and un-
fair self-dealing because their self-esteem was tied to hard work and ac-
complishment, they might be unable to avoid positional conflicts, which, 
he believed, were more persistent.68 First, inefficient top managers are 
unlikely to believe themselves as inefficient.69 Second, they may even be 
unable to recognize that positional conflicts exist in the first place.  Fi-
nally, they may be even more tempted to maintain or enhance their posi-
tions than they would in situations marked by shirking or unfair self-
dealing.70
In view of the foregoing, Eisenberg observed that “[t]he divergencies 
of interest between corporate agents and shareholders, and the special 
problem of positional conflicts, explain why some constitutive rules that 
govern publicly held corporations should be enabling or suppletory while 
other should be mandatory.”71 He then made the following agency costs-
reducing propositions in relation to public companies: 
(1) the legal rules that govern internal organization of the company and 
the conduct of corporate actors below the level of top managers should 
by and large be enabling or suppletory. The reason being that top man-
agers have both the self-interest and the power to install constitutive 
rules that will efficiently determine the roles, coordination, supervision, 
and monitoring of lower corporate agents and constrain those agents 
from giving expression to their own interests in preference to the inter-
ests of the shareholders.72
(2) the core fiduciary and structural rules that govern material diver-
gences of interest of top managers in publicly held corporation should 
be neither determined nor subject to material variation by the action of 
managers or managerial organs. This is because ‘agents whose interests 
 
board. For instance, CAMA provides that shares of a registered corporation shall carry 
one vote. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 116. 
 67. For the definition of this term and instances of position conflict, see Eisenberg, 
Corporation Law, supra note 63, at 1471–72. 
 68. Id. at 1473. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1473. 
 72. Eisenberg, Corporation Law, supra note 63. 
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may materially diverge from the interests of their principals should not 
have the power to unilaterally determine or materially vary the rules 
that govern those divergencies of interests;’73
(3) the rules in (2) above should also normally not be subject to deter-
mination or material variation even with shareholder approval, because 
of the possibility that shareholder approval may be nominal, tainted by 
conflict of interest, coerced or impoverished.74
In offering a rule-based approach to solving some species of agency 
problems, Eisenberg proposed that, “in publicly held corporations, man-
datory rules should govern those core fiduciary and structural areas in 
which the interests of shareholders and top managers may diverge.”75 
For instance, he argued that, to deal with traditional conflicts of interest, 
mandatory rules should impose a duty of fair dealing, provide for disclo-
sure of self-interested transactions, and establish an effective enforce-
ment mechanism.76 In the case of shirking, however, he argues that man-
datory rules should impose a duty of care. In essence, fiduciary duties 
should be mandatory at the core, and no difference should exist in this 
regard between closely held corporations (private companies) and pub-
licly held corporations.77
Eisenberg classified core structural rules into three main categories.78 
One set of structural rules, he argues, should provide for the appointment 
and monitoring of senior executives by a governing organ (board of di-
rectors) that is elected by the shareholders for a limited term of office, a 
majority of which is composed of members who are independent of the 
senior executives.79 A second set of structural rules should require peri-
odic disclosure of detailed financial data and information concerning ma-
terial business and legal developments and should provide for an institu-
tional mechanism to ensure that the information is reliable.80 A third set 
of rules should provide for approval of, and dissent from, transactions 
that tend to raise positional conflicts. Specifically, shareholder approval 
should be required for any control transaction or that which causes a 
change in the assets or business of the company; when a transaction in-
volves either traditional or positional conflicts, or creates a significant 
potential for overreaching by control shareholders, dissenting sharehold-
 
 73. Id. at 1473–74. 
 74. Id. at 1474. 
 75. Id. at 1480. 
 76. Id. 
   77. Eisenberg, Corporation Law, supra note 63.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
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ers should have the right to require the corporation to purchase their 
shares at fair value.81
3. Markets as Agency Costs Control Mechanism 
Those opposed to the rule-based approach to controlling agency costs 
contend that regulations overlook the contractual nature of the corpora-
tion, which requires that parties discreetly contract around agency prob-
lems, since regulation may not always produce the most efficient out-
comes.82 Scholars have noted that regulations of the type contained in a 
corporation code were essential, as they provided standard form contracts 
that shareholders would likely choose. Noting that writing contracts is 
costly, these contractarians pointed out that a corporation statute which 
contained some prescriptive rules might help reduce the transaction costs 
of negotiations. Besides, the difficulty of anticipating all possible contin-
gencies in long-term relationships make ex ante or default rules very 
helpful to lessen bargaining costs. However, they emphasize the essence 
of contracting or private ordering in the resolution of future disputes that 
could not have been anticipated and, therefore, were not specifically ad-
dressed. 
While advocating an enabling structure of corporate law that enhances 
innovation and provides flexibility for the parties, the contractarians also 
make the case83 that the control of agency costs in business corporations 
should be left to the markets, which they argue, are most effective in 
aligning both the managerial and shareholders’ interests.84 However, a 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 65. 
 83. Part of the economic theories of the corporation see the latter as a “nexus of con-
tract,” a perspective that not only equates the interests of other groups within the corpo-
rate family with those of the shareholders, but also challenges the view that management 
should be accounted to the shareholders. See Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the 
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 (1980) [hereinafter Fama, Agency Prob-
lems] (making a case for setting aside the orthodoxy that a corporation has owners, and 
arguing that the two functions attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bear-
ing, should be treated as separate factors within the set of contracts called the firm). For 
critiques of this approach, see William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corpora-
tion: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 409 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corpo-
rate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 
(1985) [hereinafter Brudney, Rhetoric of Contract]; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Concep-
tion that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 
DEL. J. CORP. LAW 819 (1999) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Dual Nature of the Firm] (arguing 
that the “nexus of contracts” theory is unsatisfactory as a positive or descriptive analysis 
of the corporation). 
 84. Ralph Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
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preference for the institution of the markets as ideal or better monitors 
means that shareholders will have no monitoring role to play.85 The mar-
kets that have been identified as capable of checking managerial excesses 
are the market for capital, the products market, the market for corporate 
control, and the managerial market.86
The takeover market is said to provide investors with an important 
source of protection when the internal control mechanisms of the corpo-
ration, which operate through the board of directors, break down.87 Ac-
cording to Jensen and Ruback, the market for corporate control is the 
arena in which alternative management teams compete for the rights to 
manage corporate resources.88 Henry Manne89 argues that, besides the 
stock market, there is no objective standard of managerial efficiency, 
particularly because courts, as evidenced by the business judgment rule, 
are loath to second-guess business decisions or remove directors from 
office.90 To Manne, therefore, “[o]nly the take-over scheme provides 
 
 85. See Fama & Jensen, Ownership and Control, supra note 49.  
 86. In some cases, the market for managers and corporate control are treated as one, 
because the two are intertwined. See Michael Jensen, Takeovers: The Controversy and 
the Evidence, in WILLIAM G. KARNES SYMPOSIUM ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 27, 28 
(Charles M. Linke, ed., 1986) (“The market for corporate control is best viewed as a ma-
jor component of the managerial labor market. It is the arena in which alternative man-
agement teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.”). Granted that 
replacement of the chief executive office may take place without a change in control, 
there is still the need to separate the two analytically. As Jensen and Smith observed, 
“competition in the labor market tends to ensure that the manager receives only a com-
petitive level of compensation. Reputational effects cause the value of a manager’s hu-
man capital to depend on his performance inside the firm.” Jensen & Smith, supra note 
32. Since the market is likely to be aware of the role a top-level manager plays in a con-
trol transaction that occasions a change in management, to the extent that top-level man-
agers anticipate a relocation of their human capital, they have incentives to invest in deci-
sions that reduce divergence from value-maximizing behavior. See Fama, Agency Prob-
lems, supra note 83, at 292–93. 
 87. Henry G. Manne, Merger and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 113 (1965) [hereinafter Manne, Market for Corporate Control]. 
 88. Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). 
 89. Henry Manne is credited with insight on the role of the market for corporate con-
trol in governance.  
 90. Manne, Market for Corporate Control, supra note 87, at 113. For the monitoring 
effect of the market for corporate control, see Mary S. Schranz, Takeovers Improve Firm 
Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry, 101 J. POL. ECON. 299 (1993) (find-
ing that banks, in jurisdictions where there are active takeover activities, perform better 
than those in jurisdictions where takeovers are restricted by legislation). But see Julian 
Franks & Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial Failure, 40 
J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1996) (The authors studied “the disciplining function of hostile take-
overs” in the United Kingdom in 1985 and 1986 and found that there was “little evidence 
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some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and 
thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of 
small, non-controlling shareholders.”91 The alignment of interests occurs, 
and with it a possible reduction of agency costs, because “[t]he very exis-
tence of potential competition for positions of incumbent managers con-
ditions them to think in terms of keeping stock prices as high as possible 
relative to other companies in the same industry.”92
The capital market, it has been argued, also constrains management’s 
excesses and forces corporate managers to allocate the company’s assets 
more efficiently. Free tradability (or transferability) of the shares of pub-
licly held companies provides an organized market, whose role is to price 
shares and transfer them at low costs.93 The stock market thus represents 
an external device for monitoring public companies. According to Fama 
and Jensen, “stock prices are visible signals that summarize the implica-
tion of internal decisions for current and future net cash flows.”94 Under-
performing managers, the argument goes, will find it more expensive to 
raise capital in the market, either by way of equity capital or debt capi-
tal.95 Thus the competitive nature of capital and the repercussion that will 
attend a company’s inability to raise the needed capital are likely to force 
 
of poor performance prior bids,” suggesting that the high board turnover did not derive 
from past managerial failures.). 
 91. Manne, Market for Corporate Control, supra note 87, at 113. 
 92. Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares—A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 
1967 DUKE L. J. 231, 237 (1967). Note that some commentators have stressed the need to 
curb takeover activities because of its damaging effect to the company’s growth and to 
the economy. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 30 BUS. LAW 
101 (1979); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: A Response to 
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 NYU L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1980) (arguing that 
tender offers should be left to the directors’ business judgment, as long as the economic 
benefits of takeovers are debatable); see also Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Contro-
versy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. (1986) (arguing that despite their 
benefits, including increased efficiency within the corporation, takeovers have created 
additional pressures on top-level corporate executives which may result in increased anti-
takeover restrictions). 
 93. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organisational Forms and Investment 
Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1985) (discussing how the characteristics of residual 
claims distinguish investment rules for various organizational forms). 
 94. See Fama & Jensen, Ownership and Control, supra note 49, at 313. While this 
assessment may be largely correct, cases exist in which the price of a company’s stock 
may be simulated to the public, so that the prices do not actually reflect the true implica-
tion of internal decisions. This sort of situation happened with Enron share prices before 
its collapse and with the share prices of Nortel before the bubble burst. See Harris & 
Kramer, supra note 60, at 64–70 (detailing corporations previously falsified financial 
reports which were later restated). 
 95. See Winter, supra note 84. 
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corporate managers to orient a corporation’s decision process toward the 
interests of residual claimants.96 However, one needs to note that unless 
the capital market is efficient,97 it may be unable to effectively perform 
its monitoring role. 
As noted earlier, the managerial market is linked with the market for 
corporate control, to the extent successful takeovers often result in the 
change of top management personnel. However, this market exists even 
outside the market for corporate control. Internally, middle level manag-
ers often aspire to displace their seniors or to gain promotion to the top, 
and those at the top are equally aware that they need to constantly per-
form well to retain their jobs. Such internal rivalry, Fama noted,98 consti-
tuted a threat to all managers, and could ultimately induce them to cut 
down on shirking or other value-decreasing behaviors. Additionally, the 
need for mobility within the industry could force managers to invest in 
value-maximizing behaviors, especially as the managerial market may 
easily access their performance records. 
4. Shareholder Voting as a Monitoring Option 
Few commentators concede any role to the shareholders of public 
companies in corporate monitoring.99 Largely, the internal monitoring 
discourse in corporate law focuses on and concedes to the board of direc-
tors the task of monitoring top-level management; whereby the board 
fails in this regard, the various markets are expected to narrow the diver-
gence between managerial and shareholders’ interests, by serving as al-
ternative or even concurrent monitoring mechanisms. 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. For a detailed analysis of capital market efficiency, see Ronald J. Gilson and 
Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanism of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
 98. See Fama, Agency Problems, supra note 83, at 292–93, 295–98.  
 99. For a detailed analysis of the perception of shareholder voting over time, see Dale 
A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting, 79 IOWA 
L. REV. 485 (1994). For the criticism of the value of shareholder voting to governance, 
see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999) (“In both theory and practice . . . shareholders’ voting 
rights—at least in publicly traded corporations—are so weak as to be virtually meaning-
less”); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 44, at 402–3; Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder 
Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 (1988) (noting that the reliability of voting as a decision 
mechanism has come under attack by collective action problems in dealing with man-
agement, as the latter controls the proxy machinery); see also Henry G. Manne, The 
“Higher” Criticism of the Modern Corporation Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 410 (1962) 
[hereinafter Manne, Higher Criticism]. 
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Notably, voting by the shareholders has been regulated differently, de-
pending on the jurisdiction. The United States and the United Kingdom 
present contrasting approaches which also reflect differences in how pol-
icy makers in these two jurisdictions perceive the shareholders’ place in 
the governance scheme relative to the extent to which they think man-
agement should account to the shareholders. For instance, proxy regula-
tion in the United States appears to reflect, over time, the lawmakers’, or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC), perception of the 
power shareholders have in corporate monitoring.100 However, since 
1992,101 there has been increasing recognition by the SEC of the need to 
not only empower the shareholder in corporate governance, but also to 
encourage increased shareholder participation, by lessening several of 
the strictures which exacerbated the costs of shareholder participation. 
On the other hand, little regulation exists under the U.K. company legis-
lation to limit shareholder participation and the shareholders’ right to 
utilize the corporate proxy machinery, as is the case under the federal 
proxy rules in the United States.102
The good news is that not all the countries in the Anglo-Saxon jurisdic-
tions share the U.S. position, which, in theory103 and practice, diminishes 
 
 100. The U.S. SEC rules on shareholder participation have developed on two fronts, 
namely, rules dealing with proxy solicitation and those dealing with the use by the share-
holders of the corporate proxy machinery. For the historical development of the latter, see 
Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Shareholder Proposal Rule 
14a-8: A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 161, 166–94 (1984). Of 
course, the audience should note that the SEC further reviewed this rule, the aim being to 
simplify their interpretation and application. The latest effort at reform was the 2003 SEC 
proposal to obligate corporations to list shareholders nominees in the corporate proxy 
materials in certain circumstances. In relation to proxy solicitation, the 1992 SEC reform 
liberalized the concept of solicitation as to exempt certain communication by the share-
holders which hitherto qualified them as solicitors and obligated the filing of proxy re-
turns. See SEC Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv), § 240.14a-2(b)(2), § 240.14a-3(f). 
It was widely believed that the old expansive definition of solicitation had a chilling ef-
fect on shareholder participation. For a comparative work that put the U.S. proxy rules in 
perspective, see Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Machinery in 
Germany, Japan and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of American 
Corporate Finance, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 145, 190–203 (1996). 
 101. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, SEC Release No. 34-
31326, 57 FED. REG. 48276 (1992). Note that the stated purpose of the amendments con-
tained in the Release was to facilitate communications among shareholders and to reduce 
the costs of complying with SEC regulations for persons engaged in proxy solicitations. 
 102. See 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8. 
 103. Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE 
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 40–41 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1973) (arguing that 
shareholders are the least in need of protection, and that focusing on them in the corpo-
rate democracy debate is anomalous because, as a group, shareholders’ interest can be 
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the shareholder constituency as a monitoring body. Shareholder voting is 
receiving increasing attention in modern corporate governance projects, 
with the OECD encouraging its members to ensure that the vote mat-
ters.104 The increasing dominance of institutional investors in corporate 
finance has helped to renew the clamor for more of a monitoring role for 
the shareholders.105 For shareholder monitoring to be effective, however, 
the voting policy in the governing corporation code should facilitate in-
formed decision making by ensuring that management furnishes suffi-
cient information to the shareholders on every crucial issue considered at 
general meetings. In the extreme, the operative voting system should pro-
mote “vote solicitation” rather than proxy solicitation, by disengaging 
participation from physical presence at meetings and reducing the cost to 
shareholders of personally participating in general meetings. Sharehold-
ers can be allowed to participate (that is vote on issues) by electronic 
means, namely telephone or via the Internet. Happily, most developed 
countries have already undertaken reforms of their corporate laws to ac-
commodate the use of modern communication technologies in corporate 
law administration and in the context of corporate governance.106
Moreover, where, as is presently the case in the United States and in 
Canada,107 the use of the Internet has been integrated in the administra-
 
“readily reducible to monetary terms” and relocated, given the workings of the security 
markets); Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1486–90 (1958) (arguing 
against the idea of voting by the shareholders generally); see also Blair & Stout, supra 
note 99; Manne, Higher Criticism, supra note 99; Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems, 
supra note 15, at 261. 
 104. See OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, pts. II & III (2004), 
available at http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/articles_oecd_corporate_governance 
_principles_2004.html. Shareholder coalition formation is one issue emphasized in the 
OECD’s corporate governance principles. See also id. pt. II.G. (“Shareholders, including 
institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with each other on issues con-
cerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to 
prevent abuse.”).  
 105. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Re-Examined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 
580–84 (1990) (examining how shareholders may overcome the collective action prob-
lems given the emergence of institutional investors). But see Edward Rock, The Logic 
and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 
(1991) (discussing the problems that might make institutional investors wary of monitor-
ing, and highlighting the fact that as agents, they have incentive problems which might 
hinder their monitoring role). 
 106. They include the United States, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211, Canada, Canada 
Business Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 132(4)-(5), and the United Kingdom, 
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, sched. 5, pts. 3 & 4.  
 107. For a discussion of the relevant laws in these and other jurisdictions, see Ige O. 
Bolodeoku, Going Virtual: Using Some Common Law World Initiatives to Update the 
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tion of both corporate and securities law to create information depository 
and retrieval systems (such as the EDGAR and the SEDAR) so as to al-
low for easy and affordable retrieval, analysis, and dissemination of cor-
porate information, one should expect the shareholder constituency to be 
more active. As dissident shareholders may now use the Internet to 
communicate with non-proponent shareholders, coordinate monitoring 
activities, and transmit information, it is not unlikely that the apathy 
which once beset the shareholders of most public companies may wane 
over time, particularly with retail shareholders.108 It is expected that poli-
cymakers, especially in Nigeria, will initiate the necessary reforms so 
that extant communication and information technologies can become 
integrated into corporate governance laws relating to enforcement of 
shareholders’ rights as well as reforms encouraging shareholder coali-
tions.109
5. Control of Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is a critical barrier between investors and issu-
ers of common shares.110 Bernard Black puts the issue more pointedly 
when he observed as follows: 
The value of a company’s shares depends on the company’s future 
prospects. The company’s past performance is an important guide to fu-
ture prospects. The company’s insiders know about both past perform-
ance and future prospects. They need to deliver this information to in-
vestors so that investors can value the company’s shares.111
Being able to value shares gives investors the chance to make rational 
resource allocation decisions. Given that the limited liability concept ex-
ternalizes risks by shifting them to corporate creditors,112 information on 
material activities of public companies will assist the creditors to better 
 
Nigerian Law on Corporate Democracy (unpublished manuscript, on file with Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law). 
 108. See Bolodeoku, Rational Apathy Theory, supra note 43 (discussing in detail how 
retail shareholders may overcome passivity by taking advantage of the possibilities of the 
Internet). 
 109. For the areas of reforms that Nigerian law may consider in new reform initiatives, 
see Bolodeoku, Going Virtual, supra note 107.  
 110. Bernard S. Black, Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markers, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 786 (2001) [hereinafter Black, Legal and Institutional 
Preconditions]. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See FRANK EASTERBOOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION 49–50 (1991). 
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evaluate risks and to determine appropriate checks to enhance their post-
bankruptcy conditions. 
However, investors’ concerns are not limited to those present at the en-
try point. Investors should be able to evaluate the companies in which 
they invest to determine whether it is rational to remain as investors or 
relocate their investments. These concerns necessitate a regime of infor-
mation disclosure that obligates corporate managers to disclose the right 
and sufficient information with little opportunity for distortions. As 
Black pointed out, “[i]nsiders have an incentive to exaggerate the is-
suer’s performance and prospects, and investors can’t directly verify the 
information that the issuer provides. This problem is especially serious 
for small companies and companies that are selling shares to the public 
for the first time.”113 It is not enough to permit corporate executives to 
restate profits. Sometimes, restatements come in too late, as most inves-
tors are already harmed by being prevented to bail out at the right time 
because they are fed with false information, as in the cases of Enron, 
WorldCom, and Nortel. 
C. Control of Agency Costs in Public Companies with Concentrated 
Ownership 
Dealing with agency costs or problems in public companies with con-
centrated ownership poses somewhat different challenges than those 
posed in a typical widely held public company, although the challenges 
are considerably similar in both. In most cases, the same group of per-
sons undertakes the risk-bearing and management functions. Even when 
major shareholders do not undertake management functions, they have 
the power to elect the directors who will appoint top-level managers.  
The fusion of risk-bearing and management functions in the same 
hands is efficient in many respects.114 First, if those who contribute large 
capital possess the technical skill required for business decisions, it will 
be efficient to combine residual risk-bearing and management func-
 
 113. Black, Legal and Institutional Preconditions, supra note 110, at 786. 
 114. See George J. Benston, The Self-Serving Management Hypothesis: Some Evi-
dence, 7 J. ACCT’G & ECON. 67 (1985); see also Yan Wang & Xiaonian Xu, Ownership 
Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firms’ Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock 
Companies (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 1794, 1997), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/WPS1700 
series/wps1794/wps1794.pdf. The authors found, inter alia, that there is positive correla-
tion between ownership concentration and firm performance; see also Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986). 
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tions.115 Allowing significant residual claimants to be decision agents 
may then substitute “for costly control devices to limit the discretion of 
decision agents,”116 because the fact that decision agents also bear the 
wealth effects of their decisions could help reduce the degree of diver-
gence between the shareholders and management’s interests.117
Where concentrated ownership is combined with weak complementary 
systems, such as laws that do not protect minority rights, under-
developed capital markets, and unreliable judicial systems, there may be 
a significant and irremediable expropriation from the minority group. 
Thus, while concentrated ownership is not problematic on its own, coun-
try-specific situations may aggravate the associated agency problems.118
A further characteristic of a public company with concentrated owner-
ship is that, unlike private or closely held companies, outside residual 
claims may not be held by persons whose relationships with management 
allow control of agency problems without the separation of management 
 
 115. One can observe that the ownership structure of privatized enterprises which the 
law envisages after privatization may be efficient in light of this observation. 
 116. See Fama & Jensen, Ownership and Control, supra note 49, at 306; see also Jer-
emy S.S. Edwards & Alfons J. Weichenreider, Ownership Concentration and Share 
Valuation, 5 GERMAN ECON. REV. 143 (2004). First, this Article provides empirical sup-
port for the view that the extent of the conflict of interest between controlling and minor-
ity shareholders depends on the extent to which the controlling shareholder’s rights ex-
ceed her cash-flow rights. Id. at 151. Second, the authors found, while focusing on own-
ership structure in Germany, that while controlling shareholders, sometimes, gain private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders, “the net effects of equal increases in 
both the control and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder does not harm, and, de-
pending on the type of largest shareholder, may benefit minority shareholders.” Id. at 
146. Pointing to the German corporate governance, the authors argued that it is difficult 
for a controlling shareholder in a German company to abuse its power, because of the 
admixture of the governance structure and minority rights over major corporate decisions. 
Id. at 147–49. 
 117. See Fama & Jensen, Ownership and Control, supra note 49, at 307–11; see also 
Ang et al., supra note 10 (confirming empirically the view of Jensen and Meckling in 
their 1976 seminal paper). 
 118. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P. Lang, Expro-
priation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia (The World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper Series No. 2088, 1999), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2088/w
ps2088.pdf (studying companies in East Asia, and finding that that the risk of expropria-
tion is indeed the major principal-agent problem for large publicly traded corporations, 
depending on whether concentration is through family holding, state, or widely held insti-
tutions or the use of pyramidal holdings, and that expropriations ultimately depend on 
country-specific circumstances); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Cor-
porate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 759 (1997) (“As ownership gets beyond a certain 
point, the large owners gain nearly full control and . . . prefer to use firms to generate 
private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders.”). 
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and control decisions. Moreover, there is no guarantee that business as-
sociates whose goodwill and advice are important to the organization are 
also potential candidates for holding minority residual claims.119 Thus, 
agency problems are kept alive in public companies that combine con-
centrated ownership and a stream of outside residual claimants, since 
decision agents are likely to be appointed by the residual claimants with 
the largest portion of claims. 
The fact that decision agents may not be hundred-percent owners cre-
ates an incentive for the managers to maximize the wealth effect of their 
decisions at the expense of outside shareholders.120 One interesting point 
to note about this type of public company is that the existence of a share-
holder or a few shareholders with high control rights does not inexorably 
mean that those few shareholders provide the greater portion of the capi-
tal,121 as control rights need not correlate with cash-flow rights, espe-
cially in countries that permit companies to issues shares with differing 
control rights. Another problem often associated with a public company 
with concentrated and dispersed ownership is the possibility that the in-
siders may abuse confidential information at the expense of the outside 
shareholders.122
Jensen and Meckling observed that “[i]f a wholly owned firm is man-
aged by the owner he will make operating decisions that maximize his 
utility.”123 And further that: 
if the owner-manager sells equity claims on the corporation which are identical 
to his own (i.e., which share proportionately in the profits of the firm and have 
limited liability), agency costs will be generated by the divergence between his 
and those of the outside shareholders, since he will then bear only a fraction of 
the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out in maximizing his util-
ity.124  
 
 119. Claessens et al., supra note 118.  
 120. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra note 9, at 313 (“As the owner-
manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcome falls and this 
will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger amount of the corporate resources in the 
form of perquisites.”).  
 121. See La Porta et al., Investor Protection, supra note 14. 
 122. Addressing insider dealing is important, at least, to provide outside investors and 
the public at large with some confidence and assurance of the effectiveness of the system. 
See Black, Legal and Institutional Preconditions, supra note 110, at 804; Brian R. Chef-
fins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United King-
dom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2001) (generally discussing the impact of law on the evolu-
tion of the separation of ownership and control in the United Kingdom). 
 123. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra note 9, at 312. 
 124. Id.  
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Jensen and Meckling further noted that as the equity of the owner-
manager falls, his claims to the company free cash flows falls, the impli-
cation being that such a fall in the owner-manager share of the total prof-
its is likely to “encourage him to appropriate large amounts of the corpo-
rate resources in the form of perquisites.”125 As a result, minority share-
holders must expend more resources in monitoring the behavior of the 
managers. They must be equally ready to initiate costly derivative ac-
tions to redress possible managerial abuse of office. But if the minority 
group lacks the capability to monitor, other types of intervention must be 
employed to protect their interest. 
Furthermore, when a public company combines concentrated share 
ownership with diffused outside equity, the shareholder-managers will 
usually have the votes to alter the memorandum and articles of associa-
tions. They can elect and remove directors and, in some cases, may be 
able to effect fundamental transactions independently of the outside 
shareholders. Because outside shareholders will realize that they have 
relatively small equity compared to the shareholder-managers, they are 
unlikely to have the incentives to monitor the managers.126
In the Nigerian context, one of the governance problems likely to ema-
nate from the privatized companies with concentrated ownership in core 
investors and scattered public ownership is that non-core investors are 
most likely to be rationally apathetic to monitoring. It may also be said 
that, if the market is efficient, in that it is able to absorb the likely ten-
dencies of owner-managers to generate agency costs as their claim to the 
company free cash flow decreases, than the amount outside shareholders 
will pay for their shares will reflect these possible costs. But this is 
merely relevant at the entry point; the threat and burden of agency costs 
are not removed and still have to be dealt with throughout the life of the 
company. Above all, significant share ownership stake in a company af-
fects its viability as a takeover target and can diminish the control func-
tion that the market for corporate control is expected to perform.127
 
 125. Id. It is important to note that the realization by the owner-manger that he has no 
total claim on the resources of the company may also induce him to shirk, rather than 
merely enhance his perquisites.  
 126. See OLSON, supra note 25, at 50–52, 55. 
 127. See Rene M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and 
the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1988) (showing that the fraction 
of share votes owned by managers is an insignificant determinant for an all-equity firm, 
as it affects the possibility of a tender offer and the size of premium. A higher equity 
stake by management, Stulz argues, would lower the probability that a hostile bid would 
occur.). 
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In this regard, internal control mechanisms, from the monitoring role 
of the board of directors128 or shareholders’ participation, may be a less 
effective mechanism in controlling agency costs. Information is crucial. 
Unless representation of the minority group on corporate boards of pub-
lic companies in this category is mandated or a robust regime of informa-
tion disclosure exists, major shareholders are likely to monopolize mate-
rial information that the other group of shareholders may need for moni-
toring. Even when there is no such monopoly, it is doubtful whether out-
side shareholders will have the time and competence to process material 
information into a monitoring tool. It is pertinent to worry about how 
agency costs in companies that combine concentrated ownership of 
shares with diffused share ownership should be monitored and con-
trolled, if the minority shareholders, most of whom may be unorganized, 
are not represented on corporate boards and have neither the time nor 
means to monitor the decisions agents. 
Because of the value of information to monitoring of any sort, it is de-
sirable to have cumulative voting through which minority shareholders 
can elect, at least, some directors on corporate boards. The presence of 
minority shareholder representatives on corporate boards could create 
information access and acquaint them with the activities of the share-
holder-managers.129 The combination of concentrated and diffused own-
ership also requires that other forms of protection exist, which outside 
shareholders can take advantage of. With a good regime of information 
disclosure and access to information on opportunistic behaviors of the 
managers, outside shareholders should be able to trigger administrative 
investigation of the affairs of the company, and, if need be, commence 
derivative actions against the owner-managers or the directors loyal to 
him or commence a proceeding charging the directors with violating fi-
duciary duties. Having examined the normative issues involved in con-
trolling agency costs in both types of public companies, the Part follow-
ing will discuss how the CAMA has responded. 
IV. RESPONSE OF CAMA TO AGENCY PROBLEMS 
In assessing to what extent CAMA conduces to effective control of 
agency costs, this Part will focus on the control mechanisms that: (1) 
limit agency costs through either private contracting or mandatory pre-
 
 128. As Warren Buffett once pointed out, if the controlling shareholder is an owner-
manager, the board has virtually no functions. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Compilation, 
The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 40 (1997). 
 129. This practice is adopted under the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA). 
Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 44 (1985). The SEC in Nigeria has also 
recommended it in its recent corporate governance project. 
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scriptions; (2) reduce behavioral opportunism on the part of managers; 
(3) align the interests of management with those of the shareholders; (4) 
reduce control positional conflicts; and (5) subject managerial behaviors 
to the shareholders’ control. 
A. Contracting Around Agency Costs and the Enabling Nature of CAMA 
As noted earlier, a corporate law system that allows managers and re-
sidual claimants to contract around agency costs may, to a considerable 
extent, produce a more efficient result than that which dictates solutions 
by regulations.130 As a mechanism to reduce agency costs, however, pri-
vate ordering is most effective when the parties’ bargaining power is 
equal or near equal and information cost is at its lowest. 
The good news is that CAMA provides an enabling structure that 
members of the corporate family may utilize to reduce agency costs. 
However, it is impossible to bargain in every situation, cost may be pro-
hibitive and contracting parties may have unequal bargaining power.  
Therefore, desirable corporate legislation should contain mandatory pro-
visions, procedural guidelines, or managerial conduct regulation to em-
power managers to initiate some transactions, while retaining share-
holder approval rights to mitigate the effect of conflicts of interest. 
In relation to the board’s management powers and the extent to which 
the board’s discretion may be limited, sections 41 and 63 of CAMA pro-
vide the essential flexibility in the framework that provides the flexibility 
needed to craft customized solutions to agency problems. Section 63(2) 
of CAMA provides that, “[s]ubject to the provisions of this Decree, the 
respective powers of the members in general meeting and the board of 
directors shall be determined by the company’s articles.”131 This subsec-
tion is then followed by a default provision in subsection (3), which em-
powers the board of directors to manage the business of the company and 
exercise “all such powers of the company as are not by this Decree or the 
articles required to be exercised by the members in general meeting.”132 
Section 63(2) thus leaves it entirely for the company to design the intra-
 
 130. This claim is the central focus of the contractarians. For the contractarian render-
ing of corporate law, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conserva-
tive Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 856 (1997) (book review); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual 
Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Per-
spective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266 (1999). For criticisms of the contract construct, see 
Brudney, Rhetoric of Contract, supra note 83; Eisenberg, Dual Nature of the Firm, supra 
note 83. 
 131. Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 63(2) (Nigeria). 
 132. Id. § 63(3). 
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corporate power structure and to provide the desirable limits or restric-
tions on the powers exercisable by corporate managers. 
While it is hardly expected that the shareholders, particularly of public 
companies, will undertake any management obligations, what is not in 
doubt is that the power of management may be curtailed or subjected to 
the shareholders’ scrutiny, even when it is conceded to the board of di-
rectors on efficiency grounds. However, until the shareholders act in that 
direction, the board of directors, when operating within powers conferred 
on it either by CAMA or the articles of association, are not bound to 
obey the directions and instructions of the members in general meetings, 
except the articles confer on the shareholders the power to override man-
agement in respect of specific matters or transactions.133 Obviously, it 
will not be cost efficient for the shareholders to direct or instruct the 
board of directors in all cases involving the business of the company; 
however, the fact that directors may, sometimes, abuse their powers ren-
ders the existence of such control desirable. 
For its full effect, section 63 should be read with section 41 of CAMA. 
While subsection (1) of the latter provision reinforces the contractual 
effect of the memorandum and articles of association between the com-
pany and its members and officers, and between the members and offi-
cers inter se, subsection (3) provides a legal platform for flexibility in the 
 
 133. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 63(4). The 
subsection provides as follows:  
Unless the articles shall otherwise provide, the board of directors, when acting 
within the powers conferred upon them by this Act or the articles, shall be 
bound to obey the directions or instructions of the members in general meeting: 
Provided that the authors acted in good faith and with due diligence.  
Id. (emphasis added). It is this author’s view that the phrase “shall be bound,” as it ap-
pears in the Act, is meaningless in light of the proviso at the end of the subsection, and 
that perhaps the draftsman inadvertently admitted the word “not,” which would have 
made the phrase read “shall not be bound.” It makes no sense whatsoever to compel a 
board acting with the power conferred on it by legislation and articles to obey the instruc-
tion of members acting in a general meeting, when the opening phrase already indicates 
that the rule intended by the subsection is to operate as a default rule. This author further 
argues that the legislature, indeed, intended to reenact the principle in the English case of 
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicated Co. v. Cunninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (C.A.), 
subject to the statutory “good faith and due diligence” clause. In essence, what the phrase 
“[u]nless the articles shall otherwise provide . . . .” implies is that the shareholders could 
reserve to themselves the power to instruct or direct the board in respect of the business 
of the company. Where such reservation has been made, it is the opinion of this author 
that the power so reserved shall apply even to matters in respect of which the Act or the 
articles have empowered the directors to act. Consequently, this provision qualifies the 
application of the common law principle enunciated in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filer 
Syndicated Co. v. Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (C.A.). 
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relationship between the company and any other party. The subsection 
provides that “[w]here the memorandum of articles empower any person 
to appoint or remove any director or other officer of the company, such 
power shall be enforceable by that person notwithstanding that he is not a 
member or officer of the company.”134
Since the section refers to “any person,” it seems to provide a frame-
work for those dealing with the company, whether in their capacity as 
shareholders, creditors, or officers to safeguard their interests by reserv-
ing the right to appoint directors that may protect their specific interest in 
the company. The directors appointed in the foregoing circumstance may 
be useful to bridge the information gap that may prevent the appointing 
party from effectively protecting his or her interest in the company. 
The foregoing analysis brings into relevance management agreements 
contemplated under the privatization scheme in Nigeria. A management 
agreement may implicate corporate governance issues. Specifically, they 
may limit the discretion of the managers or the board of directors of the 
privatized companies. While there is nothing wrong with such agree-
ments, it is important to note that, unless they are incorporated as part of 
the companies’ articles or memoranda, it may prove difficult to enforce 
the agreements. Moreover, if a term of a management agreement contra-
dicts specific provisions of CAMA relating to the powers reserved for 
the general meeting, the term may become void and unenforceable. 
The provisions of section 63 encourage pre-emptive monitoring of 
managerial actions, and they are best appreciated when compared with 
their counterpart in jurisdictions with statutory grant model. In these ju-
risdictions, such as the United States135and Canada,136 the board of direc-
tors is expressly conferred with the power to manage (or to supervise the 
management of) the business and affairs of the corporation. Because di-
rectors enjoy a statutory grant, shareholders are correspondingly denied 
the right to interfere with the management powers of boards of direc-
tors.137 Indeed, the federal proxy rules in the United States reinforce the 
 
 134. Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 41(3).  
 135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006).  
 136. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. ch. C-44, § 102(1) (1985).  
 137. Brian R. Cheffins, Michaud v. National Bank of Canada and Canadian Corporate 
Governance: Victory for Shareholder Right?, 30 CAN. BUS. L.J. 20, 23 (1998). In the 
United States, one district court’s decision affirms that a board’s power to issue shares 
and decide its own rights does not preclude the shareholders’ right to use a corporation’s 
bylaws to constrain the board is crucial. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. 
Fleming Co., No. Civ. 96-165c-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2979 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 
1997). Its importance lies in the fact that the relevant Oklahoma state provisions under 
consideration in Fleming are in pari material with those of the Delaware corporation 
code. 
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directors’ managerial power by preventing the shareholders from utiliz-
ing the corporate proxy machinery in respect of matters that fall within 
the ordinary management powers of the board of directors.138
The legislative policy that prevents shareholders from interfering with 
the management power of corporate boards in the United States and Can-
ada manifests in a variety of ways that may exacerbate agency costs. In 
the context of hostile takeovers, the statutory grant model appears to be a 
major factor that shapes the judicial views on the directors’ power in 
takeover bid transactions in these jurisdictions. By tying a board’s power 
of intervention in takeover bid situations to the board’s management 
power, the courts in these jurisdictions hold that directors can “just say 
no” to bids they perceive as harmful to corporate policy and effective-
ness, an approach that effectively eviscerates the monitoring role that 
many believe the market for corporate control will perform in corporate 
governance. 139
B. The Deregulation of Limited Liability 
The limited liability rule implies that corporate managers and share-
holders do not bear the cost of their decisions,140 and except when sued 
 
 138. The U.S. position contrasts sharply with the position in Nigeria, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and other common law jurisdictions where shareholders are not disal-
lowed from using the corporate proxy machinery in respect of matters falling within the 
ordinary powers of the board of directors. For Canada, see Canada Business Corporations 
Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 137; for Nigeria, see Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 235; for United Kingdom, see Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, 
§ 294.  
 139. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware gives authority for the defensive 
tactics mounted by target boards against takeover bids, even if the shareholders would 
have preferred the bid. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140, 1154 (Del. 1989).  The court held that: 
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the stock-
holders’ duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a 
corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of 
corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. Directors 
are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a shot-
term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate 
strategy. 
Id. (citations omitted)). For a critique of this position, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 988–94 
(2002). For an analysis of the Nigerian takeover bid jurisprudence in light of the U.S. 
position, see Ige O. Bolodeoku, The Market for Corporate Control: Assessment of the 
Role of the Target Board in Nigeria, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 269 (2004). 
 140. This is the implication of the decision in Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 
22, 35 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); see also Manne, Our Two Corporation 
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for breaches of fiduciary duties or made to account in derivative actions, 
directors may escape being held accountable for misappropriation of 
corporate assets or shirking. Moreover, the concept of limited liability, 
while shielding residual claimants from the cost of investment, external-
izes the associated risks by transferring them to creditors.141 In a way, 
therefore, limited liability has the potential to aggravate agency costs. 
The deregulation of limited liability by CAMA may, therefore, be seen 
as an insightful way to deal with agency problem, as those dealing with 
the company may force its directors to tie their fortunes to the success of 
the company and, by so doing, induce them to bond to good perform-
ance.142 The deregulation of limited liability by CAMA is even more 
commendable in view of the fact that some modern corporate legislation 
now requires companies to pay for directors’ insurance143 or excuse di-
rectors from liability for breach of fiduciary duties.144
Section 288(1) of CAMA states that, if so provided by the memoran-
dum, the liability may be unlimited for directors, managers, or managing 
 
Systems, supra note 15, at 262 (“[L]imited liability . . . allows individuals to use small 
fractions of their savings for various purposes, without risking a disastrous loss if any 
corporation in which they have invested becomes insolvent.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). For criticisms of the 
Salomon decision, see O. Kahn-Freund, Some Reflections on Company Law Reform, 7 
MOD. L. REV. 54 (1944); see also Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, 
Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975) (argu-
ing that limited liability transfers the risks of business failure from shareholders to credi-
tors without compensation); Halpern et al., supra note 47, at 129 (“The existence of a 
limited liability regime provides the owners of the firm with the ability to obtain insur-
ance, provided by the creditors, against loss on default without the necessity of the exis-
tence of a formal insurance market.”). But see Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors 
of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 526 (1967) (contending that creditors are 
often compensated for the risks they bear through high interest rates, which they often 
charge because of the limitations imposed by the limited liability rule). 
 142. The downside of such liberalization is its potential to discourage people from 
accepting board positions. This argument undergirds the director liability reforms in the 
United States. See Craig W. Hammond, Limiting Directors’ Duty of Care Liability: An 
Analysis of Delaware’s Charter Amendment Approach, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543 
(1987) (discussing the background to section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law). 
 143. See, e.g., Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 310(3) (Eng.). For Canada, see Canada 
Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 44, § 124(6) (1985). 
 144. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006). The practice is also prevalent in the 
United Kingdom since the applicable law now permits companies to pay for directors’ 
insurance; see also Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability 
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006).  
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directors of a limited liability company.145 Even where the memorandum 
does not contain an unlimited liability provision at registration, it is still 
possible to attain such a result, so long as there is a provision in the by-
laws permitting the company to alter its memorandum by special resolu-
tion to render unlimited the liability of the company’s directors, manag-
ers, or managing director.146 In practical terms, this device is likely to be 
unpopular with most directors or managing directors. But where a com-
pany is highly leveraged, the company’s creditors may require that the 
company’s memorandum be altered to permit for unlimited liability of 
directors or managing directors. 
While a company is at liberty to opt-in or opt-out of the deregulation of 
limited liability, it is suggested that companies in which inside ownership 
is significant and concentrated, and in which ownership and management 
are combined, may be required to make the liability of the owner-
manager unlimited. Since the removal of limited liability will internalize 
the risks of investment and decision making, it is expected that the com-
pany’s creditors, who are the likely beneficiaries, will find the deregula-
tion of limited liability under CAMA particularly useful. To the extent 
that the managers bear the wealth effects of their decisions, other residual 
claimants will also benefit, as the managers may be forced to signifi-
cantly reduce shirking or opportunistic behaviors. Deregulation of lim-
ited liability under CAMA is particularly suitable to the peculiar chal-
lenges of corporate governance in Nigeria. Most public companies have 
majority owners who are most likely to act as managers. Since the usual 
fear is that owner-managers may disregard the interests of minority 
shareholders, the latter may have their fears attenuated because the threat 
of expanded liability will probably align the interest of owner-managers 
with those of the minority shareholders.147
 
 145. Note that the deregulation of limited liability under CAMA is different from a 
typical case of unlimited liability under which shareholders are required to satisfy the 
excess of the corporation’s debts from their personal wealth. The CAMA device is selec-
tive in that it is only the liability of top management or the directors that may be unlim-
ited. Whether a company that opts into this regime will be able to attract quality person-
nel to serve as directors is another question. The same result may, however, be achieved 
where the chief executive officer and most members of the board of directors are major 
shareholders. 
 146. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 289(1). 
 147. The usual recourse or remedies open to minority shareholders, i.e., derivative 
action, oppression, or prejudicial remedy action, require a great deal of cost or informa-
tion to prosecute. The monitoring that comes with the deregulation of limited liability is a 
significant improvement over the traditional remedies under sections 303 and 311 of 
CAMA. 
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C. Conflicts of Interest, Self-Dealing, and Positional Conflicts 
Melvin Eisenberg is emphatic on the normative proposition in this re-
gard for the modern company law: “agents whose interests may materi-
ally diverge from the interests of their principals should not have the 
power to unilaterally determine or materially vary the rules that govern 
those divergencies of interest.”148 A related proposition is that such rules 
should also normally not be subject to determination or material variation 
even with shareholder approval. In essence, the governing rules should 
be mandatory at the core. How does CAMA respond? 
1. Negotiation of Directors’ Liability 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the English courts enforced 
provisions in the articles of association of registered companies, which 
freed directors of liability for breaches of fiduciary duties.149 However, 
the practice was soon outlawed under the English company law.150 Con-
temporary corporate law in the United States, courtesy of the amendment 
to the Delaware corporation code, permits corporations to free directors 
from liability for a breach of fiduciary duty of care.151 In addition, state 
corporate laws in the United States, Canada, and in the United Kingdom 
empower companies to buy officers and directors’ liability insurance po-
licies.152  
Provisions in corporate codes which exempt directors and officers from 
liability for breaches of fiduciary duties and those which empower the 
purchase of liability insurance policies arguably gain prominence as a 
compromise or trade-off for securing the services of qualified personnel 
to serve on corporate boards, many of whom had expressed concerns 
about the magnitude of liability relative to the gains they expected to 
make from serving as directors.153 However, it can hardly be doubted 
that a no-liability regime may induce directors to shirk or engage in be-
haviors inimical to the interest of the company. If directors knew they 
would not bear the wealth effects of their conducts, fiduciary duties 
might not motivate them to invest the time necessary to run the com-
 
 148. See Eisenberg, Corporation Law, supra note 63, at 1474. 
 149. See In re Brazilian Rubber Plantation & Estates Ltd. [1911] 1 Ch. 425, 440 
(U.K.). 
 150. See Companies Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 146 (1929) (Eng.). 
 151. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b) (7) (2006). Cf. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 310 
(Eng.). 
 152. See supra note 143. 
 153. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 144. 
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pany’s business efficiently.154 The position of a director is a crucial one, 
in view of the predictable impact that an inattention to serious business 
matters could have on the investors. 
It is in this regard that the position under CAMA deserves some com-
mendation. The Act provides that:  
no provision, whether contained in the articles or resolutions of a com-
pany, or in any contract shall relieve any director from the duty to act in 
accordance with this section or relieve him from any liability incurred 
as a result of any breach of the duties conferred upon him under this 
section.155  
This position can be compared with those in other jurisdictions, e.g., the 
United States, where a company may excuse directors from liability in its 
bylaws or obligate the company to take out insurance policies regarding 
directors’ liability.156
2. Treatment of “Golden Parachute” by CAMA 
Golden parachute is a term associated with American corporate law, 
and refers to a payment (or agreement to make a substantial payment) 
made to directors or the managing director of a target company as con-
sideration for loss of office following a takeover of the company, 
whether by friendly or hostile bid or even in a merger transaction.157 At 
its worst, a golden parachute is one defensive mechanism used to insulate 
management from the threat of a takeover, by making it costlier for a 
bidder to launch a bid or ensuring that a putative acquirer goes through 
the board rather than bypass it in a hostile bid transaction.  
While not so recognized in Nigeria, this concept is not completely new 
to our laws. Given that most public companies have significant majority 
owners, most of whom are in management positions, most directors and 
 
 154. It is worthy of note that the contractarians have argued that it is efficient for the 
parties to be able to negotiate or contract around fiduciary duties, since such negotiation 
would reflect the parties’ wishes. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel E. Fischel, Corpo-
rate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 734 (1982). For a criticism of this concep-
tion, see Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. 
REV. 595 (1997) (arguing the reasons why the corporate law fiduciary duties, contrasted 
with commercial agent-principal fiduciary duties, should not be variable at the instance of 
the parties); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obliga-
tion, 37 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988) (criticizing the Jordan court for analogizing fiduciary duty 
with “off-the-rack” rules). 
 155. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 278(8). 
 156. See Hammond, supra note 142, at 544–45. 
 157. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 662 
(1997).  
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corporate managers in Nigeria may become prone to using such an exit 
device. In view of the concentrated ownership structure of Nigerian 
companies, a takeover of a company in Nigeria may not take place with-
out the approval of the company’s board. Thus, the increased likelihood 
of merger transactions as the means to effect changes in the control of 
companies in Nigeria may pave the way for the target management to 
secure its financial future with a robust exit price. 
CAMA outlaws any payment by way of compensation for loss of of-
fice, or as consideration for or in connection with retirement from office, 
by a company to any director of a company, except when particulars of 
the proposed payment and other allied terms have been disclosed to and 
approved by members of the company.158 Additionally, an exit payment 
cannot be made without meeting those same requirements.159 A payment 
made to the director in contravention of the Act is regarded as illegal, 
and the director shall be deemed as trustee for the sum so received.160 
Moreover, CAMA imposes a duty on a director who expects to receive 
any such payment following a transfer of the company’s shares to a per-
son or body corporate to ensure that the particulars of the proposed pay-
ment are included in the notice of the offer sent to the shareholders.161 
What is unclear, however, is whether the interested director is entitled to 
vote in respect of the proposal or payment when it is tabled at the meet-
ing. 
The 1999 Investment and Securities Act (ISA) is, however, likely to in-
troduce a twist, in that section 111(6) of the ISA only requires that par-
ticulars of any proposed payment to directors in the context of a takeover 
bid be contained in the directors’ circular sent to the shareholders. Such 
disclosure is not required for merger transactions, and ISA does require 
that the provisions of “all existing enactments,” which include those of 
CAMA, “shall be read with such modification as to bring them into con-
 
 158. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, §271. Note 
that in the United States and Canada, issues relating to directors’ remuneration or com-
pensation are not for the shareholders to determine in general meeting of members. Di-
rectors’ compensation falls squarely in the category of the company’s business which 
only the board of directors is empowered to handle. For Canada, see Canada Business 
Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 102 (1985), and for Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8 § 141(a) (2007). In the respective jurisdictions in which they apply, these provisions 
confer on corporate boards the power to manage or supervise the management of the 
businesses of incorporated companies.  
 159. Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 272(1). 
 160. Id. § 272(2). 
 161. Id. §§ 273(1), 274. 
506 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:2 
                                                                                                                                 
formity” with the provisions of ISA.162 In respect of takeover bid trans-
actions, the more permissive ISA provisions may negate the purpose of 
sections 271 to 273 of CAMA, except the control which CAMA provi-
sions are designed to serve is recognized and adopted in ISA. 
D. Removal of Directors from Office 
Agency costs are often exacerbated when directors cannot be removed 
from office in deserving circumstances. Removal of directors is tied to so 
many issues, all of which are dealt with under CAMA in ways that limit 
the directors from insulating themselves from removal from office. The 
issues range from the procedure for removal, the voting rights attached to 
shares, shareholders coalition, and the right to issue shares. For instance, 
under CAMA, directors are removable from office with or without cause, 
irrespective of the contract between the director and the company. The 
best option open to a director so removed from office is to claim com-
pensation or damages in an action for breach of contract.163
This position contrasts sharply with the state of Delaware, where direc-
tors cannot be removed without cause if the certificate of incorporation 
establishes staggered terms for directors.164 Although a staggered board 
system, a practice that dominates American corporate law, is theoreti-
cally possible in Nigeria,165 such practice is of little practical effect given 
the provision of section 262(1), which allows for the removal of directors 
“notwithstanding anything in its articles or in any agreement between it 
and him.”166
Besides, the mode of appointment of directors also has some impact on 
how directors are removed and on agency costs. The American practice, 
whereby management nominates a slate of directors for the shareholders 
to vote on, does not help to ensure directors’ accountability to sharehold-
 
 162. Investments and Securities Decree No. 45 (1999), § 261(1) (Nigeria). Note that 
the Investment and Securities Act, which was originally promulgated as a decree under 
the then Military Administration, like other decrees, is to be so called by virtue of section 
315(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999).  
 163. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, §§ 262, 
268(2); see also Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2006] 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) 228 (Court 
of Appeal) (affirming the judgment of the lower court which held that the Bank had the 
right under the CAMA to remove the appellant, the bank’s managing director, from of-
fice). 
 164. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2007).  
 165. Section 259(1) of CAMA dealing with the rotation of directors is a default provi-
sion that allows a company to make different arrangement as to retirement of directors in 
the articles. Thus a company is at liberty to provide for a staggered board of arrangement, 
under which only a portion of the board members can retire after a three-year term.  
 166. Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 262(1).  
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ers. To challenge directors, shareholders of U.S. corporations are often 
forced to spearhead proxy contests, which are few and far between be-
cause the contests are usually very expensive.167  
In Nigeria, however, shareholders are at liberty to propose any person 
as a director, and there may also be an agreement in the article empower-
ing named persons to appoint directors.168 Shareholders may submit a 
proposal for a resolution to remove directors or on any matter, and 
equally submit written statements in respect of matters to be transacted at 
general meetings. Although it is required that reasonable payment be 
made for transmission,169 the company is obligated to circulate a state-
ment of resolution requisitioned by qualified shareholders.170 While the 
information contents of the new proxy rules under the SEC regulations 
made pursuant to ISA may make shareholder participation in the proxy 
process more informed,171 it is yet to be tested what impact the rules will 
have on the shareholders, given that proxy solicitation is expansively 
defined without taking care of the problems similar definition has created 
for the shareholders in other jurisdictions,172 as a result of which there 
have been some clarifications in the affected jurisdiction in order to re-
duce the chilling effect of the definition.173
E. Directors’ Remuneration 
Remuneration of top-level management and of the directors is a key 
determinant of agency costs.174 If it is right, remuneration can align man-
 
 167. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 894–95 (1991). 
 168. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 41(3). 
 169. See id. §235(4). 
 170. See id. §235(1). 
 171. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Rules and Regulations (Made Pursuant 
to the Investment Securities Act 1999), §§ 289–94 (Nigeria), available at 
http://www.sec.gov.ng/pdf/SEC%20Rules.pdf.  
 172. See Ige O. Bolodeoku, A Critique of the Theories Underpinning Proxy Solicita-
tion by the Board of Directors, J. BUS. L. 377, 381 (2001). 
 173. See., e.g., Canada Business Corporations Regulations (Canada Business Corpora-
tions Act) SOR/2001-512 § 67 (qualifying section 147 of the Canada Business Corpora-
tions Act). For similar provision under the U.S. Proxy Rules, see SEC Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 
14a-1(I)(2)(iv). 
 174. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem (Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Papers No. DP3961, 
2003), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3961.asp (The authors argue that the 
design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency prob-
lem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, they argue, 
cannot be expected to bargain at arm’s length with managers.).  
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agement interest with those of the shareholders. It is the theory that, 
when tied to the company’s stocks, directors’ compensation or remunera-
tion engenders in management and directors a sense of identification 
with, or creates a stake in, the company.175 Uncontrolled, however, re-
muneration can constitute a burden on the company’s free cash flow, 
which can hurt the corporation, its creditors, and shareholders.176
Outrageous compensation packages for corporate executives and their 
exponential increase relative to the value added have had their roles in 
the collapse of many recent celebrated corporate failures.177 Considering 
American management remuneration, Kevin Murphy wrote that from 
1992 through 2000, the median total compensation of CEOs in S&P 500 
companies nearly tripled from US$2.3million in 1992 to US$6.5 million 
in 2000.178 Option-driven escalation in CEO pay levels, Murphy ob-
served, “is not limited to S&P 500 Industrials.”179 Evidence shows “that 
median pay in S&P 500 Financial Services companies increased 300 per-
cent, form $2.6 million to almost $11 million from 1992 to 2000, while 
pay in smaller firms (defined as companies in the S&P MidCap 400 and 
SmallCap 600) more than doubled, from $823,000 to $1.8 million.”180 
Some commentators attribute exorbitant executive compensation pack-
ages to the domineering influence of CEOs over compensation commit-
tees.181 Lucian Bechuck et al. argued that, “much of what is observed in 
the world of executive compensation” can be explained by managerial 
opportunism and influence over captive boards of directors.182 Although 
 
 175. See Michael C. Jensen, CEO Incentives—Its Not How Much You Pay, But How, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS 192, 195 (Donald Chew, Jr.. & Stuart 
Gillian, eds., 2005) (“The most powerful link between shareholder wealth and executive 
wealth is direct ownership of shares by the CEO.”).  
 176. See ENRON REPORT, supra note 35. 
 177. The Enron case still presents a classic example of how ambitious and outrageous 
compensation packages could hurt the company. Id. 
 178. See Kevin M. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power 
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 847 (2002) (the in-
crease in CEO pay in S&P 500 Industrialists during the 1990s primarily reflects a dra-
matic growth in stock options, which swelled from 27% to 51% of total compensation, 
representing a five-fold increase in dollar terms).  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. For a theoretical analysis of executive compensation in the United States, see 
Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Mar-
ket Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171 (2004) (providing other alternative theories to the 
exponential rise in executive compensation compared to other countries, and critiquing 
the board capture theory of executive compensation). 
 182. Lucian Bebchuck, Jesse Fried, & David Walker, Managerial Power and Execu-
tive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 785 (2002) (basing their argument on the fact 
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CEO compensation packages in the United States are higher than their 
international counterparts,183 there seems to be a global upward swing in 
CEO pay that is hardly justifiable in terms of performance.184
Today, directors’ compensation constitutes a major issue in any corpo-
rate governance reform, principally because the costs they add are some-
times too burdensome for the company and too high to benefit the corpo-
ration, its shareholders, and other stakeholders.185 As it is consistent with 
modern corporate practice to categorize executive compensation as be-
longing to the realm of the company’s business, only the board of direc-
tors (through its compensation committee) gets to decide issues relating 
to compensation. However, experiences have shown that advertised in-
dependent boards or committees are not as independent, given the com-
plicated business ties most directors have with the corporations on whose 
boards they serve. The fact that the chief executive has a hand in the 
nomination of directors, independent or interested, is also a factor in 
gauging the level of resistance to expect from directors on the issue of 
compensation.186
Under CAMA, remuneration of directors is not fixed by the board of 
directors, but by the company in a general meeting, and is payable only 
out of the company fund.187 Besides, it is unlawful for the company to 
pay directors’ remuneration free of income tax, or calculated by refer-
ence to or varying with the amount of his income tax, except by a con-
tract to that effect, which must exist at the time of the Act and be con-
tained in the articles.188 It is also unlawful for a company to make a loan 
to any of the directors of its holding company, or enter into any guaran-
 
that the exercise price is indexed to general market movements, but is reset following 
market declines in stock prices). But cf. Murphy, supra note 178. 
 183. See Thomas, supra note 181, at 1173.  
 184. See ENRON REPORT, supra note 35.  
 185. Following the Enron Collapse, the New York Stock Exchange revised its listing 
standards to include that shareholders approve stock-based executive compensation, and 
the U.S. SEC approved it. See Order Approving NYSE and NASDAQ Proposed Rule 
Changes Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 48,108, 68 
Fed. Reg. 39,995 (July 3, 2003). 
 186. Bebchuck, Fried, & Walker, supra note 182; Brudney, Independent Director, 
supra note 56, at 612–14. Note that Murphy criticizes the view that explains high CEO 
compensation in terms of the CEOs desire to extract rent. See Murphy, supra note 178, at 
850 (distinguishing between CEOs ability to extract rent and bargain for higher pay); 
Jensen & Fuller, Director to Do?, supra note 59, at 4–6. 
 187. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 267. The 
opportunity given to the shareholders to consider directors’ remuneration is important, 
especially at a time when the likelihood that directors may drain the corporation through 
sumptuous remuneration package is on the rise. 
 188. See id. § 269. 
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tee or provide any security in connection with a loan made to directors 
by any other person.189
While CAMA expressly requires that the company approve directors’ 
remuneration, it provides that the board of directors shall fix the remu-
neration of the managing director. Without clear guidance on the factors 
to be considered in fixing remuneration, it is obvious that the possibility 
of abuse of this power by a subservient board, as seen in other jurisdic-
tions,190 cannot be ruled out, notwithstanding that compensation commit-
tees are a common feature of most board structures and in corporate gov-
ernance projects. 
It is suggested that shareholder involvement in fixing executive com-
pensation is desirable, particularly when it involves stock options,191 as 
well as the publication of executive compensation figures in the com-
pany’s proxy statements. In Nigeria, such publication will not only pro-
vide shareholders with information on executive compensation, but also 
precipitate possible review, critique, and intervention by the shareholders 
of the company where the compensation is considered to be outrageous. 
It should be remembered that, unlike in the United States or Canada 
where shareholders are not legally entitled to intervene, shareholders of 
companies registered in Nigeria can, by law, make recommendations to 
the board regarding any action to be taken by the board, notwithstanding 
that the board is empowered to manage the business of the company.192
Under CAMA, shareholders participate in determining directors’ re-
muneration or compensation in one significant respect. In relation to the 
employment contract of a director intended to be employed for more than 
five years where termination by the company is limited by agreement, 
the company is required to table the agreement with its terms before the 
general meeting for a special resolution approving the agreement.193
F. Dealing with Conflicts of Interest 
CAMA has some mandatory provisions to deal with directors’ conflicts 
of interest, outlawing certain conduct or mandating disclosure, while 
leaving others for the shareholders to decide. CAMA also deals with di-
 
 189. See id. § 270. 
 190. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 191. This is the approach taken under the new listing standards of the New York Stock 
Exchange. See generally Order Approving NYSE and NASDAQ Proposed Rule Changes 
Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 48,108, 68 Fed. Reg. 
39,995 (July 3, 2003). 
 192. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 63(5). 
 193. See id. § 291. 
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rect self-dealing by directors.194 For instance, promoters are regarded as 
fiduciaries, and are accountable for any secret profit made or for misuse 
of corporate information.195 The company may rescind any contract, 
unless after the promoter’s full disclosure of all material facts, the con-
tract is ratified by the company’s independent directors and all the mem-
bers of the company, or by the shareholders in a general meeting at 
which the promoter and other interested shareholders are disqualified 
from voting.196
While the law does not forbid directors from dealing with their compa-
nies, it requires that interested directors, whether directly or indirectly, in 
a contract or proposed contract with the company should declare the na-
ture of their interests at a meeting of the directors where the contract is 
first discussed.197 Furthermore, the Act specifically disqualifies, subject 
to certain exceptions,198 a company from entering into any arrangement 
under which a director of the company or its holding company or a per-
son connected199 with such a director acquires or is to acquire one or 
 
 194. For the importance of controlling self-dealing, see Black, Legal and Institutional 
Preconditions, supra note 110, at 804–15. 
 195. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 62(2). 
 196. See id. § 62(3). The fact that CAMA relaxes the limitation period in the enforce-
ment of the company’s right against promoters is equally important in the reduction of 
agency costs. 
 197. See id. § 277. It is important to note the effect of a failure to comply with this 
provision. First, section 277(3) provides that a general notice that the director is a mem-
ber of a specified company interested in the contract or that the director is interested 
without more is sufficient. Id. § 277(3). Moreover, failure to comply only attracts a small 
amount in penalty, except that subsection (5) preserves any rule of law restricting direc-
tors of a company from having any interest in contracts with company. Id. § 277(5). It is 
here suggested that specific disclosure of the particular interest of a director is necessary, 
considering that such disclosure is made to his or her colleagues, some of whom may 
change their minds or decide differently if they know the real nature of the transaction in 
which the disclosing director is involved.  
  On a practical note, Bernard Black has argued that only independent outside 
members of the board should consider the merit of a transaction in which a director is 
interested. See Bernard Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors, 2001 
ASIA BUS. L. REV. 3 [hereinafter Black, Core Fiduciary Duties] (“The procedural strategy 
for approval by disinterested directors can work only if a company has a reasonable num-
ber of independent directors. It can work well only if these directors are in fact independ-
ent of the executives. Otherwise, the procedures can become camouflage for a transaction 
that in fact benefits the insiders at the company’s expense.”). 
 198. For other exceptions see Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) 
Cap. C20, § 286. Other subsections of this provision also defines the liability of the direc-
tors for a contravention of the provisions of section 284 of the Act. 
 199. Section 286(8) defines several circumstances under which a person “is connected 
with” a director. Id. § 286(8). The expansive definition is essential to avoid sham transac-
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more non-cash assets of a specified threshold,200 or the company is to 
acquire similar assets from the persons aforementioned.201 Before a com-
pany can enter into an arrangement in this context, it is a precondition 
that the arrangement is first approved by a resolution of the company in 
general meeting, and if the director or connected person is a director of 
its holding company, by a resolution in the general meeting of the hold-
ing company.202 It is significant to note that CAMA codifies the common 
law rule on the competence of directors to take advantage of corporate 
opportunities,203 and tapers their impact by a requirement of ex ante dis-
closure to the company in general meeting.204
It is also crucial to the discussion of agency costs to note that directors 
are treated as trustees of the company’s moneys and properties, and are 
to exercise their powers honestly in the interest of the company and all 
shareholders, rather than in their own or sectional interests.205 In this re-
gard, the Act forbids a director from making secret profits by accepting 
from any person a bribe, gift, or commission or a share in the profit made 
by that person from a transaction involving his or her company as a quid 
pro quo for facilitating the transaction between the company and the per-
son.206 However, if the gift is unsolicited or given as a sign of post-
transaction gratitude, the director may keep the gift, provided that the 
fact of the gift is reported to the board of directors and a note is made in 
the minutes book of the directors.207 The problem with this allowance is 
that the prevailing corruption culture in Nigeria may induce ex ante ne-
gotiations of rewards for facilitating a transaction. Consequently, prohi-
bition of such practice under CAMA may prove very ineffective to arrest 
the practice. By permitting post-transaction rewards or gifts, parties may 
circumvent the law if the beneficiary of the transaction simply presents 
the reward afterwards in order to give it a cloak of legality. 
 
tions, which allow directors to avoid the obligation imposed by the Act by using their 
relatives. 
 200. The value of the asset at the time of the arrangement is not to be less than two 
thousand naira, but subject to that, exceeds one hundred thousand naira or twenty percent 
of the company’s asset value. See id. § 284(2). 
 201. See id. § 284(1). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Bray v. Ford (1886) A.C. 44 (Eng.); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver (1967) 
2 A.C. 1347 (Eng.); Canadian Aero Serv. v. O’Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R.3d. 371 (Can.). 
 204. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, §280(6). 
 205. See id.§ 283(1). 
 206. See id.§ 287(1).  
 207. See id.§ 287(3).  
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G. Shirking, Agency Costs, and the Directors’ Duties of Care and Skill 
Agency costs are not generated only when agents divert the property or 
assets of their principals. Refusal to pay attention to duty or to invest the 
necessary time required by the business, commonly referred to as shirk-
ing, can generate agency costs. As investigations into the role of direc-
tors in the collapse of Enron showed, shirking played a vital role in the 
collapse process.208 The Enron directors were found to have given far 
less attention to their responsibilities and were highly dependent on man-
agement, a situation which prevented them from being acquainted with 
the details of operations and from asking critical questions of manage-
ment.209 Happily, CAMA specifically gives some attention to shirking.  
The Act recognizes that lax duties of care and skill will undoubtedly 
exacerbate agency costs, as they may induce directors to shirk. The Nige-
rian law reformers found the common law principles on the directors’ 
duties of care unsatisfactory and recommended a more functional set of 
duties that underscore the seriousness of the role of directors in corporate 
governance.210 Regardless of how directors are appointed to serve on a 
company’s board, it is this writer’s view that section 282(4) of CAMA 
appears to enjoin directors to recognize the enormity of their role and be 
ready to give to it the time and commitment the duty requires. The sec-
tion also expects directors to candidly decline the offer to serve if, given 
the particular situation, they cannot give enough attention to the com-
pany’s business.211
The CAMA provision, which calls on directors to exercise “that care 
and skill which a reasonably prudent director would exercise in compa-
rable circumstances,” 212 is an invitation to the court to apply an objective 
standard to the conduct of directors in light of the peculiar circumstances 
of each case.213 In this respect, it is expected that courts will be assisted 
 
 208. See ENRON REPORT, supra note 35 (“The Board witnessed numerous indications 
of questionable practices by Enron management over several years, but chose to ignore 
them to the detriment of Enron shareholders.”). 
 209. Id. at 59.  
 210. The provisions of the CAMA on the duty of care and skill of directors effectively 
undermine the rationes decidendi in cases such as In re Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 
Ltd., (1925) Ch. 407, and In re Denham’s & Co., (1884) 25 Ch.D. 752 (Eng.).  
 211. See supra note 198.  
 212. Id. In fact, Nigeria seems to be ahead of the United Kingdom in this respect, ex-
cept that, through judicial activism, the U.K. courts can achieve the same objective as that 
in section 284 of CAMA. See Norman v. Theodore Goddard, [1992] B.C.C. 14 (Ch.D.) 
(Eng.); see also Cheffins & Black, supra note 144. 
 213. Nigerian courts may be guided by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in People Department Stores Inc. (Trustees of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 
which emphasizes the objective component of the assessment of whether a director 
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in determining what a reasonably prudent director will do by the admoni-
tions contained in various corporate governance projects, just as the vari-
ous opportunities offered by companies to train directors in the modern 
art of governance may become part of the court’s assessment of what to 
expect from a director.214 Specifically, it is no longer a defense to a claim 
of breach of the duty of care when a director was absent from meetings, 
because “the absence from the board’s deliberations, unless justified, 
shall not relieve a director from his or her responsibility for the actions of 
the board.”215
More importantly, CAMA imposes the same standard of care on both 
executive and non-executive directors.216 The emphasis on equality in 
responsibility and dedication expected from both the executive and non-
executive directors also addresses the propriety of outside directors con-
ceding to management on most crucial or critical issues of governance. 
At the minimum, it signifies that outside directors should see themselves 
more as business managers than mere advisers.217 By implication, sec-
tion 282(4) of CAMA requires non-executive (outside) directors to be 
more proactive in the discharge of their duties. As the Court of Appeal of 
New South Wales (Australia) rightly observed in Daniels v. Anderson,218 
the “concept of a sleeping or passive director has not survived and is in-
consistent with the requirements of current company legislation such as, 
at the relevant time, [sections] 229 and 269 of the Companies (New 
South Wales) Code.”219 Arguably, a court of law may be justified in re-
 
breached the fiduciary duty of care under Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S. 1985, 
c. C-44, s. 122(1)(b)).  
 214. See Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v. Maxwell, [1993] B.C.C. 120, 
139 (Eng.) (“[T]he law may be evolving in response to changes in public attitudes to 
corporate governance.”). The global nature of the concerns in corporate governance, 
which is gradually leading to some form of convergence of practices, should also be cru-
cial to how the courts should perceive the position of directors in the modern company. 
See Black, Core Fiduciary Duties, supra note 197. 
 215. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 283(3). 
 216. See id. § 282(4). 
 217. See Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 96, 99 
(Thomas Clarke ed., 2004) (“the lack of active discussion of major issues at typical board 
meetings and the absence of discerning questions by board members result in most board 
meetings resembling the performance of traditional and well-established, almost religious 
rituals.”). For an account of the traditional relationship between directors and manage-
ment, see also Robert Monks, The Director’s New Clothes (Or, the Myth of Corporate 
Accountability), in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS 151 (Donald Chew, Jr. 
& Stuart Gillian eds., 2005).  
 218. Daniels v. Anderson, (1995) 118 F.L.R. 248 (Austl.). 
 219. Id. at 310.  
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quiring that non-executive directors establish the basis of their judgment, 
by showing the efforts made outside the assistance given by the inside 
members of the board to gather more information, particularly if the facts 
of the case show that more information is required before any good deci-
sion can be taken.220 While non-executive directors may simply rely on 
the presentations of inside members of the board, the court, arguably, 
may hold that, given the nature of what is being deliberated upon, a 
proper discharge of the directors’ duties will require non-executive direc-
tors to seek independent information from other key employees of the 
company. This sort of provision is quite commendable, as they attune 
with the modern dictates of good governance. Besides, they could, if 
properly given a purposive interpretation by the court, be effective in 
addressing some of the agency cost concerns.221
It is important to note that a breach of the directors’ duties may be as-
serted and enforced in the course of the winding up of a company. Sec-
tion 506(1) of CAMA allows a liquidator, receiver, and creditor, among 
others, to prove against any person that the latter participated in carrying 
on the business of the company recklessly or with intent to defraud its 
creditors. The court is empowered to hold such a person personally liable 
“without any limitation of liability for all or any of the debts or other li-
abilities of the company.”222 In particular, this provision is a warning to 
outside directors, and it reinforces the need for them to be more involved 
 
 220. Nigerian courts can learn a lot from Australian decisions on the scope of direc-
tors’ duty of care and skill. Interestingly, the recent judgments in Australian courts which 
espouse the modern principles of directors’ duties of care, skill, and diligence were in-
spired by the judgment of Judge Pollock of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Francis 
v United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). In Francis, Judge Pollock stated that a 
director: (a) should become familiar with the fundamentals of the business in which the 
corporation is engaged; (b) is under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the 
activities of the corporation; (c) is required to monitor corporate affairs and poli-
cies; (d) is required to maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation, by 
regular reviews of financial statements; and (e) may need to inquire further into matters 
revealed by a review of financial statements. Id. at 821–23. For an example of an Austra-
lian decision, see Daniels v. Anderson, (1995) 118 F.L.R. 248, 309 (Clarke JA & Sheller 
JA); see also Australian Sec. & Investments Comm’n v. Loiterton, (2004) NSWSC 172. 
 221. One can only appreciate the value of the Nigerian provisions for liability for 
breaches of duty of care, and particularly section 279(7) of CAMA in light of the fact that 
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code was enacted as a direct response to the decision 
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), 
which held directors liability for breach of duty of care. See also Mark A. Sargent, Two 
Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 278 
(1989) (discussing the genesis of the amendment made to the Delaware Code in the area 
of director liability). 
 222. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 506(1).  
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in governance, rather than turn a blind eye to the running of the affairs of 
the company as business managers. Moreover, the provision permits 
those empowered under it to seek remedy against directors where doing 
so would have been very difficult while the company is a going concern. 
H. Minority Empowerment 
1. Derivative Action 
Derivative action is one minority empowerment device adopted under 
Nigerian law, apparently to reduce agency costs.223 To be sure, the rem-
edy against prejudicial or oppressive actions, which the legislature em-
powers the shareholders to seek, is another form of minority empower-
ment, albeit, one which protects the personal interests of the complaining 
shareholders rather than that of the company. The focus in this section is 
on the derivative action remedy. 
A derivative action instituted by minority shareholders does not benefit 
only the shareholders that bear the cost of the litigation. It is an action 
intended to benefit the company as a whole by remedying a wrong com-
mitted against the company either by management or when management 
is reluctant to act on behalf of the company. Given this fact, the greater 
the difficulty in instituting a derivative action, the less likely minority 
shareholders will have recourse to remedy a wrong against the company. 
While minority shareholders will indirectly benefit from a successfully 
prosecuted derivative action, there is no doubt that conceptually the ac-
tion may help reduce agency costs. 
Several elements of the CAMA provisions dealing with derivative ac-
tion deserve some mention. First, a range of applicants may submit to the 
court for leave to commence the action.224 Second, the fact that an al-
leged breach of a right or duty owed to the company has been or may be 
approved by the shareholders of the company is not sufficient for a stay 
or dismissal by the court of an action already commenced.225 While the 
court may take such facts into consideration, the Act empowers the court 
 
 223. Id. §§ 300–30.  
 224. Under section 309 of CAMA, “applicant” means:  
(a) a registered shareholder or a beneficial owner and a former registered owner 
or beneficial owner of a security of a company; (b) a director or an officer or a 
former director or officer of a company; (c) the Commission; or (d) any other 
person who in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make an applica-
tion under section 303 of the Act. 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 309. 
 225. See also id. § 305. 
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to exercise its discretion and look into the justice or equity of the matter 
and decide what is right in the circumstances.226 Because the focus of a 
derivative action is the protection of the company’s right, it is important 
that majority shareholders are not allowed to determine what sort of right 
the company may enforce, and by so doing, compromise the company’s 
interest, particularly when to do so may benefit them indirectly. Third, 
the Act gives courts the discretion to order that an applicant be reim-
bursed for the cost of the action.227 Because no guidance is provided, it is 
for the court to look into the merit of the applicant’s effort in deciding 
whether or not to order reimbursement. 
The provisions dealing with derivative action under the Act, however, 
suffer from some fundamental defects, which may undermine sincere 
efforts to reduce agency costs.228 In particular, the conditions for bring-
ing a derivative action implicitly attenuate the value associated with the 
action as a device for reducing agency costs. No action can be brought 
unless the applicant can show to the satisfaction of the court that the 
wrongdoers are the directors who are in control and that the directors will 
not take necessary action.229
Limiting the wrongdoers to the directors who are in control of the 
company reduces the scope of the action. In most cases, even when di-
rectors are not the wrongdoers, they may collaborate with the wrongdo-
ers and refuse to bring an action. Thus, derivative action under CAMA 
may not cover cases of wrongs done to the company by persons other 
than the directors in control of the company. Even in the situation cov-
ered by the Act, minority shareholders are bound to confront information 
asymmetry. Derivative action designed to correct wrongs done to the 
company by directors in control is information intensive. Except where 
minority shareholders have representation on the board of directors, they 
 
 226. See id. § 304(2).  
 227. See id. § 304(2)(d). Moreover, the Act provides that an applicant seeking to en-
force a company’s right through a derivative action shall not be required to give security 
for costs in any application made or action brought or intervened in under section 303 of 
the Act. See id. § 307. The court may equally order the company to pay an applicant in-
terim costs before the final disposition of the case. This is apparently to reduce the finan-
cial impact on an applicant of a prolong litigation. See id. § 308. 
 228. See Brian R. Cheffins, Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experi-
ence and British Prospects, 1 CO. FIN. & INSOLV. L. 227 (1997). 
 229. The CAMA position can be contrasted with that under section 239(2) of the Can-
ada Business Corporations Act, where no such condition as contained in section 303(a) of 
CAMA exists. The Nigerian approach is, it is submitted, overly restrictive. Note that 
except in relation to section 303(2)(a) of CAMA, the provisions of CBCA and CAMA on 
derivative action are in pari material. 
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may not have access to enough information with which to convince the 
court that a wrong has been committed. Yet, the Act does not make al-
lowance for discovery, which would have facilitated the disclosure of 
information that may be crucial to the action. The good news, however, 
is that present or past directors or the Commission, who have better ac-
cess to information about boards’ operations and activities are equally 
empowered to seek the court’s permission to commence derivative ac-
tions. Moreover, it is hoped that putative petitioners may take advantage 
of the rules of court on discovery to overcome information asymmetry. 
2. Administrative Investigation 
Investigation of company affairs by an administrative agency, in this 
case, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC),230 is one potent weapon 
that may significantly lessen managerial profusion and address part of 
the agency problems. The power given to the CAC to appoint competent 
persons to investigate a company may work well to stymie the acuteness 
of information asymmetry.231 The knowledge by corporate managers that 
investigation may be conducted on the direction of the CAC into how 
they have run the affairs and managed the business of the company may 
also constitute a check on their conduct. In light of the fact of ownership 
structure of most Nigerian companies, the investigation device will go a 
long way in helping to address not just the concerns of minority share-
holders, but also help change how corporate managers see their responsi-
bilities. 
Under CAMA, the CAC may, on the application of shareholders hold-
ing one-quarter of the class of shares issued, appoint inspectors to inves-
tigate the affairs of a company and report on them as the CAC may di-
rect.232 In this case, the applicants will be required to provide such evi-
dence to the CAC to prove that they have good reasons for requiring in-
vestigation.233 Obviously, the requirement of evidence to support a re-
quest to investigate is designed to give some discretion to the CAC in the 
matter and to discourage frivolous applications. Moreover, a court may 
direct that the affairs of a company be investigated, in which case the 
CAC has no discretion and must conduct an investigation.234 The CAC 
 
 230. The Commission is the body responsible for the administration of the CAMA and 
its functions are more particularly set out in section 7 of the Act. See C.O. Okonkwo, The 
Corporate Affairs Committee, in ESSAYS ON COMPANY LAW 14 (E.O. Akanki, ed., 1992).  
 231. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 314.  
 232. See id. §§ 314(1), (2)(a). 
 233. See id. § 314(3). 
 234. See id. § 315(1). Note that sections 304 and 312 of the CAMA empowers a court 
to make such orders as it may think fit in the proceedings instituted under section 303 or 
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may also appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company under 
the circumstances listed in section 315(2) of CAMA. The power of in-
spectors appointed under sections 314 and 315 of the Act to examine 
books, records, and accounts maintained by directors of the company 
under investigation, or to examine officers (past or present) or agents of 
the company235 is a considerable weapon, which, if properly deployed, 
may prove very useful. 
I. Information Disclosure and Accountability 
Under the Investment and Securities Act, public companies seeking to 
raise capital from the securities market are obligated to make very exten-
sive disclosure of the companies’ activities and prospects.236 Indeed, the 
long list of items on which information is required in the prospectus is 
bound to significantly reduce information asymmetry and help investors 
evaluate the company. Because management or the board of directors 
faces both criminal and civil liabilities should they falsify or misrepre-
sent material information or fail to disclose it in the prospectus, it is ar-
guable that the monitoring effect of disclosure will produce its desired 
effect on management. Moreover, the new proxy regime, which requires 
management to disclose information on specific transactions, is equally 
supportive of the overall effort to make corporate managers more ac-
countable. However, the fact that ISA is yet to properly grapple with the 
importance of continuous disclosure of information of material changes 
as they occur may undermine the effectiveness of external control 
mechanisms, particularly the market for corporate control. 
J. Strengthening the Board Structure Through Mandatory Audit  
Committee 
Ordinarily, CAMA empowers a corporate board to perform its duties 
through committees.237 The audit committee is one such committee 
commonly established by public companies worldwide. Indeed, the role 
and composition of the audit committee has come under intense scrutiny 
following the collapse of Enron and other big corporations in the United 
States.238 Interestingly, CAMA mandates every public company to estab-
 
311 of the Act. The court may well conclude that investigation is necessary in the particu-
lar circumstance of the case before it. 
 235. See id. § 317. 
 236. See Investment and Securities Decree No. 45 (1999), § 50; Rule 225 of the Nige-
rian SEC Rules and Regulations (pursuant to ISA, 1999). 
 237. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 64(a). 
 238. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. I, II, III, 116 Stat. 746 (2002) 
(focusing on several aspects of auditing, auditors’ responsibility, audit committee and the 
520 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:2 
                                                                                                                                 
lish an audit committee, and stipulates as to the committee’s member-
ship,239 an approach this writer believes may prove beneficial in the 
overall drive to reduce agency costs. Specifically, section 359(4) of 
CAMA requires that the audit committee “shall consist of an equal num-
ber of directors and representatives of the shareholders of the company 
(subject to a maximum of six) . . . .” Indeed, one may be permitted to say 
that an audit committee is a committee of the company, rather than that 
of the board. Unlike section 64(a) of CAMA, which permits a board of 
directors to exercise its powers through committees consisting of such 
members of the board as the latter consider necessary, section 359(4) 
mandates a public company, rather than the board, to establish an audit 
committee. 
That shareholders have direct representation on audit committees sug-
gests that directors do not dominate audit committees in Nigeria. Not 
being members of the board, the shareholder representatives on an audit 
committee are expected, theoretically, to provide the necessary balance 
in the way the committee is expected to perform its functions. The Nige-
rian approach contrasts sharply with that in the United States and most 
common law countries where the concern is mainly with the independ-
ence of director-members of audit committees; it is somewhat anomalous 
in those countries for non-directors to serve on audit committees, be-
cause an audit committee is seen as a committee of the board, rather than 
that of the company. 
It is, however, noteworthy that the Nigerian approach with regards to 
membership of the audit committee may pose some problems in practical 
terms. While contemporary corporate governance reforms of audit com-
mittees focus on the quality and independence of members, CAMA does 
not address who the shareholders may appoint as members of an audit 
committee. But it is becoming increasingly crucial for the members of an 
audit committee to be knowledgeable in financial matters, so they can 
make meaningful contributions in the course of the committee’s delibera-
tions. Moreover, one can only hope that the shareholder representatives 
on audit committees will not compromise their independence, especially 
as they may see the opportunity given to them to serve as a rare privilege 
to join the directors in sharing the spoil of office, rather than an opportu-
nity to add value to the corporation on whose committee they serve.   
 
board’s relationship with external auditors). For Nigeria, see Code of Corporate Govern-
ance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation (2006), §§ 3.12, 4.15, 4.16, 5.3.12, 7.1.4; 
NYSE REPORT, supra note 3.  
 239. See Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), (1990) Cap. C20, § 359(3)–(4). 
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K. The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Banks Post  
Consolidation  
In Nigeria, the separation of ownership and control may be realized 
much faster in the financial (especially banking) sector than in other sec-
tors. The Code of Corporate Governance Practices issued by the CBN 
deserves mention here, especially because, unlike most corporate gov-
ernance codes, the CBN code is mandatory.240 Some of its provisions are 
definitely designed to reduce agency costs. The fact that banks must 
comply with it and include the Code’s compliance status report in the 
audited financial statements241 underscores the banks’ responsibility to 
actively take steps that policymakers believe could prove useful in deal-
ing with agency costs. 
It is evident from the preamble to the Code that one of the CBN’s main 
objectives is to provide an additional framework for effective governance 
that could minimize agency costs. The CBN noted, among other things, 
that “poor corporate governance was identified as one of the major fac-
tors in virtually all known instances of a financial institution’s distress in 
the country.”242 Other specific corporate governance concerns which the 
Code identifies as requiring attention include fraudulent and self-serving 
practices among members of the board, management, and staff; over-
bearing influence of the chairman or managing director/chief executive 
officer, especially in family-controlled banks; weak internal controls; 
abuses in lending, including lending in excess of single obligor limit; and 
incompetent directorship.243  
With the foregoing backdrop, one is able to relate better to some of the 
recommendations in the Code, which the CBN made mandatory for 
banks. The Code now requires a separation of the office of the chief ex-
ecutive officer and that of chairman of the board of directors. It further 
provides that no two members of the same extended family should oc-
cupy the position of chairman and that of the chief executive officer or 
executive director of a bank.244 It requires that a committee of non-
executive directors should determine the remuneration of executive di-
rectors, and that the non-executive directors’ remuneration should be 
limited to sitting allowances, directors’ fees, and reimbursable travel and 
 
 240. Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation (2006), § 
1.7. 
 241. Id. § 6.1.15. 
 242. See id. § 1.3.  
 243. Id. §§ 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.10, 2.11. 
 244. Id. §§ 5.2.1, 5.2.3. 
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hotel expenses.245 More importantly, the Code requires banks to establish 
“whistle-blowing” procedure that encourages (including assurance of 
confidentiality) all stakeholders to report any unethical activity or breach 
of the corporate governance code using, among others, a special email or 
hotline to both the bank and the CBN.246
V. CONCLUSION 
It must be noted that the use of agency costs as a tool of analysis within 
the corporate law and governance systems is still a novel subject in Nige-
ria; in part because efforts by scholars to explore the various interconnec-
tions between law, economic, and other aspects of social sciences to pro-
vide theoretical frameworks assessing the effectiveness of the law as an 
institution as well as the understanding of motivations of those entrusted 
to implement the law, is yet to predominate our scholarship. This Article 
is a modest effort to articulate: (a) the inevitability of agency costs and 
their persistence within the Nigerian corporate law and governance sys-
tems; and (b) various theoretical approaches that should inform the initia-
tives to deal with them. 
Having noted that Nigerian companies combine both concentrated and 
dispersed ownership structures, whether by choice or policy design, the 
Article addresses the peculiarity of the agency problems associable with 
those structures. On balance, CAMA’s response to agency problems and 
costs has been impressive. As this Article has discussed, however, there 
is significant room for improvement in Nigerian corporate governance. 
 
 245. Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation (2006), § 
5.3.9. 
 246. Id. § 6.1.12. 
